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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN AN AGE OF
ALTERNATIVE FACTS
ALLISON ORR LARSEN*
Objective facts—while perhaps always elusive—are now an endangered species. A
mix of digital speed, social media, fractured news, and party polarization has led to
what some call a “post-truth” society: a culture where what is true matters less than
what we want to be true. At the same moment in time when “alternative facts” reign
supreme, we have also anchored our constitutional law in general observations
about the way the world works. Do violent video games harm child brain develop-
ment? Is voter fraud widespread? Is a “partial-birth abortion” ever medically nec-
essary? Judicial pronouncements on questions like these are common, and—
perhaps more importantly—they are being briefed by sophisticated litigants who
know how to grow the factual dimensions of their case in order to achieve the
constitutional change that they want.
The combination of these two forces—fact-heavy constitutional law in an environ-
ment where facts are easy to manipulate—is cause for serious concern. This Article
explores what is new and worrisome about fact-finding today, and it identifies con-
stitutional disputes loaded with convenient but false claims. To remedy the
problem, we must empower courts to proactively guard against alternative facts.
This means courts should push back on blanket calls for deference to the legislative
record. Instead, I suggest re-focusing the standards of review in constitutional law
to encourage fact-checking. It turns out some factual claims can be debunked with
relative ease, and I encourage deference when lower courts rise above the fray and
do just that.
* Copyright © 2018 by Allison Orr Larsen, Robert E. and Elizabeth S. Scott Research
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assistance I thank Gailen Davis, Paige Melton, and Brian Boland. For their helpful insights
and suggestions, I thank Neal Devins, Erwin Chemerinsky, Mike Klarman, Jeff Bellin,
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2017 ICON-S Conference, and the faculty at the University of Oxford where I was fortu-
nate enough to spend a semester pondering these issues and re-thinking many of my
assumptions about the law.
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INTRODUCTION
Oxford Dictionary’s 2016 word of the year was “post-truth,”1 and
President Trump has now introduced us to the phrases “fake news”2
and “alternative facts.”3 These expressions all point to the same phe-
nomenon: In today’s political dialogue, we believe what we want to
believe. Objective facts—while perhaps always elusive—are now
endangered species. Some combination of technological speed, infi-
nite access to information, a balkanized press, and a diluted notion of
expertise has led to a very central role in our political conversations
for claims about the way the world works. And—as we are learning—
these facts are not always what they appear to be.
Six U.S. states now require that a woman seeking to terminate a
pregnancy be told that abortion may increase one’s risk for breast
cancer,4 despite a definitive statement from the National Cancer
Institute categorically denying any such connection.5 Republican
Congressmen repeat the claim that global warming is “the greatest
1 Post-truth is defined as “circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in
shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.” Cynthia Kroet, ‘Post-
Truth’ Enters Oxford English Dictionary, POLITICO (June 27, 2017), http://www.politico.eu/
article/post-truth-enters-oxford-english-dictionary/.
2 The President used the phrase “fake news” fifteen times in his first month in office to
impugn what he thinks is unreliable journalism. See Danielle Kurtzleben, With ‘Fake
News,’ Trump Moves from Alternative Facts to Alternative Language, NPR (Feb. 17, 2017),
http://www.npr.org/2017/02/17/515630467/with-fake-news-trump-moves-from-alternative-
facts-to-alternative-language (discussing the President’s use of the term on Twitter).
3 “Alternative facts” is an expression first used by U.S. Counselor to the President,
Kellyanne Conway, during a Meet the Press interview on January 22, 2017. Ms. Conway
was defending the White House’s statement about the attendance at Donald Trump’s
inauguration as President of the United States. Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White
House Offered “Alternative Facts” on Crowd Size, CNN (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.cnn
.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-alternative-facts. As explained below, see infra
p. 104, I borrow this phrase from Conway but add my own definition.
4 Those states are Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, Texas, Oklahoma, and Alaska.
Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Texas have all codified the requirement by statute.
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6709(a)(3), 6710(a)(2) (Supp. 2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
33(1)(a)(ii) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02.1(1)(d) (Supp. 2017); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(1)(B)(iii) (West 2017). Alaska and Oklahoma include the
connection with breast cancer in the printed materials provided to women seeking
abortion. See OKLA. STATE BD. OF MED. LICENSURE & SUPERVISION, A WOMAN’S RIGHT
TO KNOW 17 (4th ed. 2015), http://www.awomansright.org/pdf/AWRTK_Booklet-English-
sm.pdf (noting that studies regarding a link between breast cancer and abortion have
reached differing conclusions); Possible Medical Risks or Complications of Abortion,
ALASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/wcfh/Pages/
informedconsent/abortion/risks.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2017) (detailing risks including
blood clots, cervical injury, and bacterial infections).
5 See Chinue´ Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The
Medical Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, 9 GUTTMACHER
POL’Y REV. 4, 8 (2006) (noting the National Cancer Institute’s (NCI) categorical statement
that “[i]nduced abortion is not associated with an increase in breast cancer risk” and that
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hoax ever perpetrated on the American people,”6 despite the over-
whelming consensus among scientists worldwide that the opposite is
true.7 Democrats in Congress continue to argue that it is unsafe to
store nuclear waste underground, despite insistence by the National
Academy of Sciences that there is no basis for that fear.8 And of
course President Trump’s claim that “millions of people . . . voted ille-
gally” in the 2016 election remains unsubstantiated to date.9
“Alternative facts” (by which I mean false but convenient state-
ments of reality) are infecting the democratic process. And at the
same moment in time when we find ourselves labeled a post-truth
society, Americans have also steeped our constitutional law in factual
claims about the way the world works. Modern constitutional debates
in the United States often turn on questions of fact. Is a “partial-birth
abortion” ever medically necessary?10 Do violent video games harm
“this determination was ‘well-established,’ [which is] the institute’s highest rating”); see
also id. (documenting state abortion counseling materials regarding breast cancer).
6 Politico Staff, Climate Skeptics in Congress, POLITICO (July 26, 2013), http://www
.politico.com/gallery/2013/07/climate-skeptics-in-congress/001199-016948.html (providing
the statement of Senator Jim Inhofe (R-Oklahoma) made on August 1, 2012); see also The
Anti-Science Climate Denier Caucus, THINKPROGRESS (June 26, 2013, 1:44 PM), https://
thinkprogress.org/the-anti-science-climate-denier-caucus-732ec3a2a4d4 (collecting similar
statements from congressional Republicans).
7 See The Anti-Science Climate Denier Caucus, supra note 6 (stating that ninety-seven
percent of scientists say climate change is happening); see also DAVE LEVITAN, NOT A
SCIENTIST: HOW POLITICIANS MISTAKE, MISREPRESENT, AND UTTERLY MANGLE SCIENCE
28–43 (2017) (explaining how politicians denying climate change misrepresent the science).
8 For example, Representative Shelley Berkley, Democrat of Nevada, and Senator
Catherine Masto, another Nevada Democrat, have advocated against the Yucca Mountain
project, a national site dedicated to nuclear waste disposal. John Collins Rudolf,
Republicans Open Inquiry on Yucca Mountain Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES: GREEN (Apr. 5,
2011, 12:46 PM), https://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/republicans-open-inquiry-on-
yucca-mountain-shutdown (identifying Berkley’s concern about the Yucca Mountain’s
location and groundwater issues); Daria Sokolova, Assembly Resolution Opposes Yucca
Mountain, PAHRUMP VALLEY TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017), http://pvtimes.com/news/assembly-
resolution-opposes-yucca-mountain (quoting Masto calling the Yucca Mountain Project “a
colossal waste of taxpayer money”). Their calls are made despite insistence from the
scientific community that there is no scientifically founded reason to be alarmed about the
safe disposal of nuclear waste underground. See Yucca Mountain Myths and Facts
Opponents Distort or Ignore Research, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST. (Feb. 2011), https://www
.nei.org/Master-Document-Folder/Backgrounders/Fact-Sheets/Yucca-Mountain-Myths-
and-Facts-Opponents-Distort-o (debunking various myths about the Yucca Mountain site).
9 See Kevin Liptak & Dan Merica, Trump Believes Millions Voted Illegally, WH
Says—But Provides No Proof, CNN (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/24/
politics/wh-trump-believes-millions-voted-illegally/index.html (indicating that “[a] number
of studies have found no evidence of widespread voter fraud”).
10 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165–66 (2007) (noting that evidence from the
District Courts contradicted Congress’s finding that the procedure is never medically
necessary).
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child brain development?11 Does money corrupt politics?12 How
common are instances of in-person voter fraud?13 General observa-
tions about the world like these (so-called “legislative facts”) hold sig-
nificant influence on the way courts construct and apply constitutional
rules today.14 This results in constitutional decisions anchored in legis-
lative facts and fat with secondary authorities bolstering those
observations.15
The goal of this Article is to warn about the combination of these
two forces: a constitutional law rich in factual claims coupled with an
environment where information is very easy to manipulate. Building
on prior work—in which I have identified sloppy and “creative” over-
reach by advocates on factual claims16—this Article explores a related
but more sinister problem. I identify constitutional disputes where a
central question of legislative fact has produced opposing narratives
with expert authorities on each side, and I demonstrate that some of
these “facts” are easily debunked once critically examined. To be
clear, I am less interested in factual questions where genuine experts
are truly undecided and uncertainty remains. I instead focus on factual
claims that propel legal arguments even though some relatively
modest fact-checking could expose major flaws in their reliability.
Of course, the American legal system is accustomed to dealing
with competing factual claims; that is, after all, what an adversarial
11 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799–801 (2011) (rejecting
California’s evidence from research psychologists purporting to show that violent video
games cause harm to minors).
12 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010) (discussing whether
“independent expenditures” are corrupt).
13 See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 201–02 (declining to find the
statute as imposing excessively burdensome requirements where the record contained a
single affidavit of in-person voter fraud) (2008).
14 For a very comprehensive treatment of this observation and an excellent tour on the
way constitutional law depends on factual claims, see generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS (2008).
15 I am not alone in noticing this trend. See generally A. Christopher Bryant, The
Empirical Judiciary, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 467 (2008) (reviewing David Faigman’s work);
Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61
DUKE L.J. 1, 43–50 (2011) (discussing “[l]egislative [f]acts [l]et [l]oose”); Timothy Zick,
Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 115 (2003) (observing the Court’s “empirical turn” in constitutional law).
16 See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1255, 1286–1305 (2012) [hereinafter Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact
Finding] (discussing where the sources of in-house fact-finding come from and the risks of
the modern approach); Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 59,
97–108 (2013) [hereinafter Larsen, Factual Precedents] (arguing for a default rule of “no
authoritative force to Supreme Court statements of fact”); Allison Orr Larsen, The
Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1784–1808 (2014) [hereinafter Larsen,
The Trouble with Amicus Facts] (presenting substance- and process-based objections to
amici expert testimony).
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system is all about. Factual disputes have been a part of constitutional
debates for a very long time.17 But what is happening today, I argue, is
different in a fundamental way. There are new forces at work that
should make us concerned that the same disease plaguing today’s
political dialogue will infect (or further infect) the judiciary. For one
thing, modern technology and the digital age make factual informa-
tion extremely easy to access18 and—perhaps more importantly—the
familiarity with this technology stokes judicial confidence in digesting
this sort of factual claim.
Furthermore, constitutional litigants have become quite sophisti-
cated at growing the factual dimensions of their arguments. Both con-
servative and liberal social movements have invested time and money
in strategically finding the right factual frame for their legal arguments
and then getting the necessary relevant experts before judges at all
stages of litigation. “Law-office history” is a familiar and unflattering
phrase to describe the tendency of advocates to shop for historians
who will tell a friendly—but incomplete—historical account to corrob-
orate a legal argument.19 What is happening today, I submit, is “law
office history” gone wild. Advocates know that they need experts on
all sorts of factual matters to mount a successful constitutional case,
and they can easily recruit these experts to file amicus briefs or other-
wise convey their expertise to the courts. Some of this expertise is
valuable of course, but, as demonstrated below, that is not universally
true.
Finally, social networking sites and a “balkanized media”20 have
played a big part in fracturing our collective sense of what is true and
17 See David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 545–47
(1991) (discussing how legislative facts played a role in the 1824 decision by Chief Justice
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
18 See Frederick Schauer, The Decline of “The Record”: A Comment on Posner, 51
DUQ. L. REV. 51, 56 (2013) (“[W]e can appreciate that judicial factual inquiry into matters
not argued below, not found in the appellate record or briefs, and not discussed at oral
argument is indeed a relatively new phenomenon, fostered substantially by the ease of
electronic research.”).
19 Judge Jeffrey Sutton ably describes the problem of law office history:
Reliance on law-office history—whether produced by lawyers or, what may
come to the same thing, mercenary historians—runs a considerable risk: a
selective use of historical materials to advance an argument without a fair
treatment of countervailing evidence. It is often far too easy to find an expert
in the subject who will corroborate any view you can name.
Jeffrey S. Sutton, The Role of History in Judging Disputes About the Meaning of the
Constitution, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1173, 1185 (2009).
20 I believe the credit for this phrase—or at least the popularity of it—goes to President
Obama. See David Nakamura, Media Critic Obama Is Worried that “Balkanized” Media Is
Feeding Partisanship, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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what is not. Facts that were once labeled outrageous are now quickly
shared to those who want to believe them and are legitimized simply
by their accessibility. People are shy to test their ideas and quick to
denigrate those with opposing views. At the end of the day, confirma-
tion bias and echo chambers have led to what I call a “my team-your
team” double set of facts—about climate change, risks of vaccination,
the prevalence of voter fraud, and more.
Journalists and social scientists are well aware of these new infec-
tions to our democracy.21 But what has not been adequately explored
to date is the effect these changes will have on the interpretation of
our Constitution. Because judges, like the rest of us, are vulnerable to
confirmation bias, and since constitutional law has become increas-
ingly dependent on factual claims, I argue that there is a real risk the
toxic political dialogue of rogue facts will increasingly afflict the inter-
pretation of our charter document and the vital rights it protects.
All is not lost, however. I conclude this Article by claiming that
courts are capable of rising above the fray. Law has always depended
on judges to make distinctions “between good and bad authority, priv-
ileged and nonprivileged authority, and authorities that rank higher or
lower in the hierarchy of authorities.”22 There is no reason why distin-
guishing “good facts” from “alternative facts” cannot be added to the
list—and indeed I provide examples of federal district court judges
(judges appointed by Presidents of both parties) who are doing just
that.23
Historically, those who worried about bad facts in constitutional
litigation found themselves in debates about deference and institu-
tional competence (both as between courts and legislatures and as
between levels of courts).24 I enter those two debates here.
The traditional claim is that courts do not have the same fact-
finding tools as legislatures and are thus not equipped to get the facts
politics/media-critic-obama-is-worried-that-balkanized-media-are-feeding-partisanship/
2016/03/27/8c72b408-f1e3-11e5-89c3-a647fcce95e0_story.html (discussing the impact of
technology on the dissemination of political viewpoints during the 2016 presidential
campaign).
21 See infra Section II.B.
22 Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization
of Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495, 497 (2000).
23 See infra Section III.C.
24 See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1170 (2001) (explaining but then expressing
doubt about the assumption that “as a matter of comparative institutional competence, the
Court is better at sorting out the law and legislators are better equipped to get the facts
right”).
40216-nyu_93-2 Sheet No. 6 Side B      05/02/2018   12:38:48
40216-nyu_93-2 Sheet No. 6 Side B      05/02/2018   12:38:48
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\93-2\NYU201.txt unknown Seq: 8  2-MAY-18 8:21
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right.25 But this argument, I submit, pre-dates a world of infinite infor-
mation and endless apparent expertise. In an age where the political
dialogue is contaminated by biased presentation of factual claims, the
calculus about institutional competence to digest facts must change.
To protect constitutional law from alternative facts, we must empower
courts to proactively guard against them—and judges must rise to
meet the challenge. Specifically, I push back on blanket calls for defer-
ence to the legislative factual record—calls that are present particu-
larly in our federal courts, who label themselves “reluctant fact-
finders.”26 That reluctance is too costly in today’s “fact-y”27 environ-
ment, and it is applied too inconsistently to be principled. I suggest
instead re-focusing the standards of review in constitutional litigation
so that courts are tasked with evaluating the process used to generate
the factual claims presented.
Moreover, I suggest re-thinking the conventional wisdom that
this sort of factual claim is best left to appellate courts. Trial judges
have their hands on the levers of the adversarial system and they are
well-positioned to debunk facts that deserve debunking – more so
perhaps than their appellate counterparts. As a corollary, I encourage
deference to the lower federal courts when they are actively engaged
in this time-intensive fact-checking work.
Although not an inevitable path (and indeed not one followed by
every country),28 U.S. constitutional law is awash in empirical claims,
25 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (“We owe
Congress’ findings deference in part because the institution ‘is far better equipped than the
judiciary to “amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data” bearing upon’ legislative
questions.” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) (plurality
opinion))).
26 See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding,
84 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (2009) (“In keeping with this self-described role, federal courts have
generally deferred to congressional and state legislative fact-finding.”).
27 “Fact-y” is a word I invented and have used before. On the spectrum between law
and fact, “fact-y” describes the area on the fact side of the scale—meaning, as described
below, claims that can be falsified and are supported by secondary authorities.
28 Perhaps our closest legal cousin, the United Kingdom, does not anchor its judicial
opinions with factual observations about the world. One commentator noted:
To be blunt about it, for most of its history the British judiciary has tended to
maintain “the law-is-the-law approach” to legal language. On this model of
decision-making, the job of the judiciary is conceived of as positivistic and
machine-like: judges are supposed to find out what the law is (eschewing any
inquiry into what it ought to be) by consulting the “plain meaning” of statutory
words and common law precedents.
Louis E. Wolcher, A Philosophical Investigation into Methods of Constitutional
Interpretation in the United States and the United Kingdom, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239,
283 (2006).
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and there is no indication this will change any time soon.29 But there
are serious consequences to embracing the factual narrative in a world
where facts are cheap and slippery. Our new splintered political dia-
logue coupled with (and perhaps caused by) modern technology has
us at a crucial turning point. U.S. courts can continue to anchor consti-
tutional law in factual assessments about the way the world works, but




In order to evaluate my warning about the effect of alternative
facts on constitutional law, one must first assess—in the pithy phrasing
of Fred Schauer—“[w]hat [i]s [n]ew and [w]hat is [n]ot.”30 I cannot
and do not claim that a fact-heavy constitutional law is entirely new.
After all, most of us know that Roe v. Wade included plenty of med-
ical research from Justice Blackmun’s 1972 summer studying at the
Mayo Clinic,31 and the “Brandeis Brief” (a brief that emphasizes fac-
tual information over legal arguments) dates back to 1908.32 At the
same time, however, the emphasis on facts in constitutional law has
taken new shape—both in terms of the centrality of these claims and
in the way in which they are generated. It is to those developments
that I now turn.
A. The Somewhat New: “Fact-y” Constitutional Law
and the Digital Age
Pick up any issue of the U.S. Reports today and one will quickly
encounter “fact-y” claims and non-legal authorities: Justice Kennedy
citing statistics on car crashes,33 Justice Breyer explaining rates of
medical complications following abortions,34 Chief Justice Roberts on
29 To be sure, legislative facts are on the rise in areas of the law beyond just disputes
arising out of the Constitution. I have chosen to narrow the scope of this Article to
constitutional claims, however, because of the heightened stakes and the prevalence of
examples of “my team-your team” facts in those cases. I certainly acknowledge that the
problems I identify are not limited to these cases.
30 Schauer, supra note 18, at 55.
31 See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 82–83, 90–91 (2005) (discussing Blackmun’s research at the
Mayo Clinic library).
32 See Schauer, supra note 18, at 55 & n.25 (noting the brief from Mueller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908)).
33 Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2011), overruled by Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
34 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2311–15 (2016).
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the economics of the health insurance industry.35 As Timothy Zick
observed back in 2003, constitutional law is “in the throes of a wide-
spread empirical turn.”36 “Questions that in the past were [once]
answered conceptually, or even with reference to purported judicial
common sense,” Zick explained, “are now routinely expressed empiri-
cally. . . . [F]rom rigorous social science and medical research, to
lighter survey fare and data compilations . . . .”37
But before one can get into causes or consequences of this “fact-
y” turn, a few words are necessary on what I mean by “fact.” As I
have conceded in the past, there is no satisfactory definition of a state-
ment of “fact” as compared to a statement of “law.”38 Several scholars
think there is no difference at all between the two concepts while
others explain that statements of law and statements of fact—while
not static polar opposites—are distinct and real categories that exist
on a spectrum.39 Although this is a tough debate, it is one that can be
avoided for present purposes. As Schauer puts it, “[a]ll distinctions
potentially have borderline cases. . . . And although lawyers, particu-
larly, are likely to be preoccupied with dusk when people ask them
about the distinction between night and day,” that does not mean the
distinction is not worth making in the first instance.40
Thus, my working definition of a “fact” draws from two common
characteristics that lead most of us to label certain statements factual
ones when we encounter them.41 First, factual claims are ones that can
theoretically be falsified—meaning they can be tested as true or false
35 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485–86 (2015).
36 Zick, supra note 15, at 118. Zick marks the beginning of this empirical turn
somewhere in the early 1990s. See id. at 195 (“Prior to the early 1990s, empirical markers in
constitutional law were a rarity.”).
37 Id. at 118.
38 See Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 16, at 67–73 (discussing law versus fact
and “acknowledg[ing] the possibility that there may be no clear analytic distinction
between” them).
39 Compare Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (2003) (arguing that “the concepts ‘law’ and ‘fact’ do not
denote distinct ontological categories”), Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L.
REV. 859, 863 (1992) (“[T]he law-fact distinction, whatever its utility, is purely a creature of
convention.”), and John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25
CONST. COMMENT. 69, 71 (2008) (“There is no analytical dichotomy between law and
fact.”), with Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction Between
Fact and Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 917–19 (1992) (“There is an analytic difference,
independent of convention, between law and fact . . . .”), and Henry P. Monaghan,
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233 (1985) (conceding that the
concepts are not “static polar opposites” but “[r]ather, [the two] have a nodal quality; they
are points of rest and relative stability on a continuum of experience”).
40 Schauer & Wise, supra note 22, at 498.
41 For a longer discussion on my position of “law versus fact,” see Larsen, Factual
Precedents, supra note 16, at 67–73.
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“with a degree of detached certainty.”42 And second, factual claims
are typically followed by evidence. By this I mean that “a factual
assertion is often followed by ‘look it up’ (or, more likely, ‘Google it’),
whereas a normative assertion or a proffered legal interpretation is
not.”43
Drawing a similar line years ago, Fred Schauer and Virginia Wise
asked a helpful question in distinguishing legal from non-legal author-
ities: “[W]ould the source have been available on the shelves of a typ-
ical federal, state, county, municipal, or law school law library in, say,
1970?”44 If not (like a general interest newspaper, periodicals not
aimed at lawyers, or books like, How to Buy and Care for Tires), then
chances are it is an authority backing up a factual claim.
Complicating this groundwork even more, “facts” are further
divided using the slippery distinction between “legislative fact” and
“adjudicative fact.”45 An adjudicative fact is “the stuff of ordinary liti-
gation”46—the facts of the case, or the “whodunit” facts.47 By con-
42 Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court Should
Defer to Congressional Factfinding Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 337, 378 (1984). I stand on the shoulders of others who have helpfully
elaborated on this definition. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the
Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1018 (1989)
(“[T]he fact that scientific theories are vulnerable to falsification imparts a strength
stemming from having taken the risk of refutation.”); id. at 1020 (“The testing of theories
forms the battlefield of the scientific enterprise, and it is in the trenches that science
maintains its principal advantages over common sense. . . . [S]cience subjects theories and
hypotheses to systematic and constant tests, in order to uncover the outer limits of their
strengths or explanatory powers.” (footnote omitted)); Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts
and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 145, 150 (“I rely on the basic scientific
definition of facts as (at least in theory) falsifiable.”).
43 Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 16, at 70; see also Amy Kapczynski,
Historicism, Progress, and the Redemptive Constitution, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041,
1066–67 (2005) (“Finding the facts involves investigation, and the facts can be more or less
certain, depending on the quality of the evidence and the quality of the sleuthing.”).
Certainly, this definition is imperfect, but it is important to remember that our legal system
draws this line between law and fact all the time—in order to allocate decisionmaking
authority, assign levels of deference, and determine stare decisis effect, to name a few
examples. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 39, at 1769 (calling the law-fact distinction “the
legal system’s fundamental and critical distinction”); Friedman, supra note 39, at 917–19
(making a similar argument).
44 Schauer & Wise, supra note 22, at 499.
45 “Legislative fact” and “adjudicative fact” are phrases coined by Kenneth Culp Davis.
See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942) (arguing that factfinding for the creation of
law and determination of policy differs from factfinding for particular parties to a
particular case). Others have subsequently refined the concept and created new labels, but
it is the original Davis articulation upon which I primarily rely.
46 Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 111, 113–14 (1988).
47 Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, supra note 16, at 1255.
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trast, a legislative fact is a generalized statement about the way the
world works. A legislative fact “transcend[s] the particular dispute,”48
and provides descriptive information about the world that judges use
as foundational “building blocks” to form and apply legal rules.49
It is tricky business to pinpoint the moment in time when U.S.
constitutional law began embracing legislative facts and empirical
rationales.50 For a long time, as David Faigman explains in his book
on the subject, “constitutional pronouncements float above the empir-
ical mire, neither being informed by contingent realities nor subject to
empirical check by those realities.”51 But this tide has turned.52
Scholars generally agree that the trend toward factual claims to
support legal arguments has its roots with the birth of legal realism,
and certainly picked up steam with the dawn of the Internet age.53 In
any event, the available empirical evidence is clear that—compared to
thirty years ago—judicial opinions are now longer,54 padded with sig-
nificantly more citations,55 and rich with “nonlegal” authorities.56
48 Faigman, supra note 17, at 552.
49 Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise
Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1988).
50 Zick explains that the Rehnquist Court ushered in this empirical turn. See Zick,
supra note 15, at 118–19 (describing how the Rehnquist Court’s adoption of empiricism
was the logical outgrowth of the economic and utilitarian methods utilized by the Burger
Court). Courts used balancing tests before then, he concedes, but they didn’t actually
measure legislative predicates. Id.
51 FAIGMAN, supra note 14, at 1.
52 See Zick, supra note 15, at 115 (observing a shift towards “constitutional
empiricism,” a trend “characterized by judicial reliance in constitutional review on
empirical and scientific conventions and processes”).
53 See id. at 129–30 (describing the use of data and empirical methods by legal realists
in the 1920s and 1930s); see also Schauer & Wise, supra note 22, at 497 (noting the
dramatic increase of Supreme Court citations to nonlegal sources since 1990 and arguing
that this is caused in part by increased use of the Internet).
54 See Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of
U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 634–35 (2008) (describing a notable
increase in median Supreme Court majority opinion length beginning in the early 1970s).
55 See Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of
Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 531–32 (describing an increase in the
median number of citations in Supreme Court majority opinions based on 26,681 opinions
between 1791 and 2005).
56 See Schauer & Wise, supra note 22, at 502 (describing “a genuine and substantial
increase in the frequency of nonlegal citation[s] by the United States Supreme Court” since
1990); see also John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S. Supreme
Court Opinions, 94 L. LIBR. J. 427, 430–43 (2002) (documenting the frequency and nature
of nonlegal citations referenced in Supreme Court opinions from 1989 to 1998); Bezalel
Stern, Nonlegal Citations and the Failure of Law: A Case Study of the Supreme Court
2010–11 Term, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 79, 107 (2013) (describing the use of nonlegal
citations in the 2010–2011 term and noting a recent increase in the use of nonlegal
citations).
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This last observation is worth a pause. Citation rates are up gen-
erally in the law, a development that is almost certainly related to dig-
ital technology.57 As Judge Posner colorfully put it speaking about his
law clerks, people now “feel naked unless they are quoting and citing”
authorities in their arguments.58 And, importantly, this leads not only
to opinions that are padded with legal authorities, but also to a
proliferation of “nonlegal” ones—authorities that go to the factual
questions lurking in the background (and sometimes foreground) of
the case.59 Judges and lawyers now regularly cite to newspaper arti-
cles, books, online data sets, websites, and even occasionally
Wikipedia to back up their generalized observations about the
world.60 Today “lawyers, judges, and law clerks . . . find it increasingly
important to look to a wider range of materials.”61 Schauer and Wise
documented this change in 2000, and recent new studies indicate the
shift is here to stay.62
This change has consequences for the law generally. If the law “is
increasingly seen necessarily to involve a wider range of facts and
norms than has traditionally been supposed,”63 it is not surprising that
those “nonlegal” arguments will eventually take center stage.
Why might this be? There are probably several causes, but it is
hard to deny that the Internet was a game-changer. In the last twenty
57 See Cross et al., supra note 55, at 531–32 (noting that the rise in citation rates in U.S.
Supreme Court decisions can be attributed to, among other things, access to electronic
databases); Casey R. Fronk, The Cost of Judicial Citation: An Empirical Investigation of
Citation Practices in the Federal Appellate Courts, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 51,
69–70 (finding a correlation between the number of cited cases in federal appellate
opinions and judicial access to electronic legal databases); Joan Ames Magat,
Bottomheavy: Legal Footnotes, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65 (2010); Shane Tintle, Note, Citing
the Elite: The Burden of Authorial Anxiety, 57 DUKE L.J. 487 (2007).
58 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 148
(1996).
59 See Schauer & Wise, supra note 22, at 500–09 (documenting a rise in nonlegal
authorities); see also Hasko, supra note 56, at 432 (finding that the Supreme Court cited
more than 1800 nonlegal books, articles, dictionaries, newspapers, and other sources
between 1989 and 1998); Stern, supra note 56, at 105 (finding that during the 2010–2011
term, the Supreme Court cited sources from disciplines including linguistics, history,
science, literature, and others).
60 See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 15, at 57 (explaining that courts engage in their own
research, looking to historical records and social science reports to resolve legislative fact
disputes); Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, supra note 16, at 1287–90
(describing the process of judicial in-house fact finding); Lee F. Peoples, The Citation of
Wikipedia in Judicial Opinions, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2009) (finding 407 federal and
state judicial opinions with some reference to a wiki or Wikipedia article); Schauer & Wise,
supra note 22, at 500–03 (tracking citations to nonlegal authority in Supreme Court
opinions).
61 Schauer & Wise, supra note 22, at 510.
62 Id.; see, e.g., Cross et al., supra note 55, at 531–37; Fronk, supra note 57.
63 Id.
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years the world has undergone a revolutionary change in how infor-
mation is transmitted and received.64 Factual information is now
cheaply manufactured and easily posted to the world with a click of a
mouse.
One troubling consequence, as I have fretted about in the past, is
that factual claims are pressed to courts without adequate adversarial
testing.65 Who needs an expert at trial when convenient studies can be
found on Google or funded by a friendly source and then cited to a
judge as a factual authority in an amicus brief?66 This shortcut of the
adversarial process risks tainting the law with unreliable claims.
But there is more to worry about. Facts are not just easier to
access in the digital age, they are also easier to legitimize. Factual
claims that may have once been labeled as outrageous assertions from
fringe players are now easily distributed in a way that makes them
seem more mainstream.67
Al Gore has likened the Internet to the “Wild West” stage of the
early printing press.68 He is optimistic that we will learn to tame this
vast new tool and he thinks fears about its abuse are overblown.69 But,
as NPR reporter Audie Cornish pushed back in her interview of Mr.
Gore, there is an important difference between digital technology and
any innovation that came before it: “[Y]ou couldn’t get your pamphlet
to everybody, right? Like, today, if you plant the seed of something
64 See Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, supra note 16, at 1286
(explaining how access to online databases like Westlaw and Lexis has impacted legal
citations in Supreme Court briefs and opinions); Schauer, supra note 18, at 56 (noting that
the growth of judicial reliance on nonlegal sources is in large part a product of the ease of
access to electronic information); see also Jeffrey Bellin & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Trial
by Google: Judicial Notice in the Information Age, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1137, 1156–64
(2014) (discussing the expanse of online information now available during the Information
Age and discussing how that affects judicial notice rules); Schauer & Wise, supra note 22,
at 510–13 (discussing changes to legal argument and authorities given the ease of finding
sources digitally).
65 See Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, supra note 16, at 1803 (noting the
tension between the Court’s commitment to the adversarial process and its reliance on
amicus briefs to answer questions of fact).
66 For examples of this occurring, see my prior work. See generally Larsen, Confronting
Supreme Court Fact Finding, supra note 16, at 1286 (explaining that nonlegal sources have
been brought to the Supreme Court’s attention by amicus briefs); Larsen, The Trouble with
Amicus Facts, supra note 16, at 1760–61 (noting judges’ willingness to rely on factual
assertions presented in amicus briefs).
67 For examples of this phenomenon, see generally LEVITAN, supra note 7. For
instance, Levitan explains how politicians have publicly voiced concerns about the link
between the HPV vaccine and “mental retardation”—a “mythical connection” that is
without any medical support. Id. at 195.
68 In the Age of Fake News and Alternative Facts, Al Gore Remains Optimistic, NPR
(Mar. 14, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/03/14/520162882/in-the-age-of-fake-news-and-
alternative-facts-al-gore-remains-optimistic.
69 Id.
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outrageous and not true, there’s a chance the president would retweet
it.”70
Finally, there is another, more subtle consequence of the digital
revolution that likely accounts for the rise in “fact-y” constitutional
law: It seems that being surrounded by facts changes one’s attitudes
about them. For judges—and indeed for everyone living in 2018—no
factual question seems out of reach. We can all access infinite informa-
tion on our phones, so it is no wonder that there is a bolstered faith in
our ability to understand the world around us. The information age, in
other words, has produced an increased confidence in digesting fac-
tual information. This may at least partially explain the increased cita-
tion to nonlegal materials in judicial opinions generally and the
“empirical turn” in constitutional law specifically.71
But this newfound confidence with facts is also worth a pause. If
we are all capable of digesting facts quickly, then this dilutes expertise
in a dangerous way. As Harry Collins asks in his provocative new
book: Are we all experts now?72 Collins is quite worried about the
dilution of scientific expertise. Citing the politicization over debates
on climate change and vaccination, Collins argues, “[i]f we start to
believe we are all scientific experts, society will change: it will be those
with the power to enforce their ideas or those with the most media
appeal who will make our truths.”73 Moreover, the flip side of the coin
is also scary: that our ease with factual expertise will be marshaled
only in convenient spots—judicially deployed in charts and graphs in
some cases, and denigrated as “gobbledygook” in others.74
Of course, creative factual narratives in constitutional arguments
are not entirely new, and one can likely think of old examples in
which false facts have infected judicial decisions well before the digital
revolution.75 But it seems hard to believe that the increase in cita-
70 Id.
71 See Zick, supra note 15, at 196 (“As courts have become more confident consumers
of empirical data they have enshrined their newfound faith in data and quantification in
constitutional law.”).
72 HARRY COLLINS, ARE WE ALL SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS NOW?; see also LEVITAN, supra
note 7, at 1–8 (discussing how politicians bend science to serve their own political
purposes).
73 COLLINS, supra note 72, at 131.
74 Compare Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626 (2013) (using a graph to
compare black and white voter registration rates in southern states in 1965 and 2004), with
Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017)
(Roberts, C.J.) (expressing concern about assessing gerrymandered electoral districts
under standards he characterized as “sociological gobbledygook”).
75 A horrifying but older example is Buck v. Bell. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207
(1927) (upholding a statute permitting compulsory sterilization of the intellectually
disabled because “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough”); Stephen Jay Gould,
Carrie Buck’s Daughter, NAT. HIST., July 1984, at 15–16 (discussing Buck v. Bell, and
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tions—particularly for statements of fact—is unrelated to the new way
in which we all trade information.
B. The Really New: Social Media and Fact-Savvy Litigants
Changes in information technology and an emphasis on factual
authorities in court decisions are important, but they have also been
around for a few decades at least. In considering the intersection
between constitutional fact-finding and a world of “alternative facts,”
there are at least two additional new forces that are very new and that
deserve special attention. They are: (1) the rise of social media and
polarized news outlets, and (2) an expansion of litigating social move-
ments and their sophistication at growing facts central to their causes.
1. Social Media and “My Team-Your Team” Facts
I certainly do not believe that constitutional law was pure and
untainted by confirmation bias and motivated reasoning before the
invention of the Internet and Facebook.76 But there is a reason that
phrases like “alternative facts” and “post-truth” keep popping up now
and not before. A recent article in The Economist explains it this way:
“[Post-truth politics] picks out the heart of what is new: that truth is
not falsified, or contested, but of secondary importance.”77
There is thus something new in the air—and it is not just that
facts are everywhere.78 The real change is more chilling than that.
America has always been a place where people held starkly different
noting two false facts in the decision—Carrie Buck was in fact a woman of “obviously
normal intelligence,” and most mental deficiencies are in fact not passed by inheritance);
see also Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 61 (1985) (explaining that neither Carrie Buck, nor her mother
Emma or daughter Vivian, displayed traits that belied Holmes’s description of them as
imbeciles).
76 Motivated reasoning and confirmation bias are phrases used by psychologists to
explain the human tendency to make decisions with a prior goal in mind and to confirm
what one already believes to be true.
77 Art of the Lie, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21706525-politicians-have-always-lied-does-it-matter-if-they-leave-truth-behind-
entirely-art.
78 See Yes, I’d Lie to You, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.economist
.com/news/briefing/21706498-dishonesty-politics-nothing-new-manner-which-some-
politicians-now-lie-and (“Post-truth politics is advancing in many parts of the world.”); see
also Olivia Ward, Truth, Lies and Democracy: Journalism in the Age of Trump, MOYERS &
CO. (Mar. 13, 2017), http://billmoyers.com/story/truth-lies-democracy-journalism-age-
trump/ (“[E]veryone can have their own ‘alternative facts’ delivered to them by social
media via robotized algorithms. They need never emerge from their self-affirming media
silos into the chilling air of reality.”). In Part III, infra, I will argue that this change
significantly alters the evaluation of institutional competence—courts versus legislatures—
to find generalized facts. But for now the point is just to observe that something is
changing about our political dialogue.
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political views, but now it seems those differences have evolved into
“my team-your team” facts.79 Whether one believes climate change is
man-made or voter fraud is an epidemic, for example, may well
depend on one’s political affiliation. Perhaps comedian Stephen
Colbert had it right when he coined the phrase “truthiness” in 2005.80
In today’s political dialogue, Colbert explained sarcastically, ideas that
“‘feel right . . . should be true.’”81
There are likely many reasons for this shift—including some posi-
tive American traits, like the tendency to question institutions and to
not accept the status quo.82 But other explanations for the rise of “my
team-your team” facts are less noble.
A chief culprit here is social media. Broadly defined as technolo-
gies that facilitate the exchange of information distribution, the ser-
vices provided by companies like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram
(and likely more companies that I am too old to really understand)
have radically changed the way people communicate ideas today.83
These networks have almost completely supplanted the six o’clock
nightly news in terms of how people educate themselves about the
world. And that change brings with it some troubling consequences.
In the unsettling words of one journalist: “The fragmentation of news
sources has created an atomized world in which lies, rumour and
gossip spread with alarming speed. Lies that are widely shared online
within a network, whose members trust each other more than they
trust any mainstream-media source, can quickly take on the appear-
ance of truth.”84 The crux of the problem is that social media creates
an echo chamber where “facts” from friends are repeated, exacer-
bating confirmation bias and giving authenticity to claims based
simply on how often they are shared.85
79 See Toby Bolsen et al., The Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public
Opinion, 36 POL. BEHAV. 235, 237 (2014) (discussing the concern that partisan
identification slants decisionmaking).
80 See Ben Zimmer, Truthiness, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/10/17/magazine/17FOB-onlanguage-t.html (discussing Colbert’s creation of
“truthiness,” meaning an assertion that feels like approximation of reality, unburdened by
fact).
81 Yes, I’d Lie to You, supra note 78 (citing the legal luminary Stephen Colbert).
82 See Art of the Lie, supra note 77 (noting that post-truth politics has come about in
part because of traditionally noble democratic values, including the questioning of received
wisdom and institutions).
83 See Jan H. Kietzmann et al., Social Media? Get Serious! Understanding the
Functional Building Blocks of Social Media, 54 BUS. HORIZONS 241, 241 (2011) (discussing
how the emergence of social media brought about a new communication landscape).
84 Art of the Lie, supra note 77.
85 See Walter Quattrociocchi et al., Echo Chambers on Facebook 14–15 (June 13, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795110
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Social media is just the new tool, however. It is exacerbating a
tendency we already possess. Dan Kahan has done important work in
this area. Using experiments where people are tasked with evaluating
factual claims packaged in different narratives, Kahan’s work demon-
strates that people tend to “endorse whichever position reinforces
their connection to others with whom they share important commit-
ments.”86 We are in the midst, he says, of an “American culture war of
fact.”87
Our technological tools today, in other words, enable us to resist
testing our preconceived notions about the way the world works—
what the law calls “legislative facts.”88 This is not healthy. As one cog-
nitive scientist explains, being unwilling “to subject our opinions to
thorough examination and alternative views results in the develop-
ment of opinions that are factually flawed and further perpetuates
divisions in society because it is anchored in our deep seated
prejudices and what we want to believe as opposed to actually what is
factually accurate.”89
And, to make matters worse, these changes in technology are
coupled with a dramatic pattern of increased party polarization. Polit-
ical scientists have documented that “[t]he polarization between the
legislative parties is, perhaps, one of the most obvious and recogniz-
able trends in Congress during the last 30 years.”90 The gap in the
political parties is mirrored by a gap in the electorate generally:
“Democrats are more liberal and Republicans are more conservative
than they were 50 years ago.”91 Moreover, the political divide has led
(finding that Facebook users show a tendency to seek out and receive information that
strengthens their preferred narratives and to reject information that undermines them).
86 Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications Failure, 463 NATURE 296, 296 (2010).
87 See Donald Braman et al., The Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making
Sense of—and Making Progress In—The American Culture War of Fact (GW Law Faculty
Pub. & Other Works, Paper No. 211, 2007), http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_
publications/211 (finding that while a majority of Americans value social welfare ahead of
moral values in terms of political importance, what people believe ought to be done to
promote social welfare is correlated with their cultural outlook).
88 See discussion supra Part I.
89 Ivanpal S. Grewal, Opinion, Political Discourse in the Age of Fake News and
Alternative Facts, STAR (Feb. 27, 2017), http://www.thestar.com.my/opinion/online-
exclusive/making-progress/2017/02/27/political-discourse-in-the-age-of-fake-news-and-
alternative-facts/ (quoting the work of cognitive scientists Steven Sloman and Phillip
Fernback).
90 Sean M. Theriault, Party Polarization in the US Congress: Member Replacement and
Member Adaptation, 12 PARTY POL. 483, 485 (2006); see also Neal Devins, Party
Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of Constitutional Questions, 105
NW. U. L. REV. 737, 751 (2011) (providing graphs that display the party polarization in
Congress from 1879 to 2010).
91 Lilliana Mason, “I Disrespectfully Agree”: The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting
on Social and Issue Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 128, 128 (2015).
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to greater “partisan bias, activism, and anger.”92 In the “contemporary
American political environment, there is evidence of increasing hos-
tility across party lines.”93
These developments are likely related to the aforementioned
changes in media consumption. According to polls conducted by the
Pew Research Center, “Republicans account for only 24% of NPR
listeners whereas Democrats account for only 28% of talk radio lis-
teners.”94 As Neal Devins has explained, “proliferation of media out-
lets—cable television, radio, and the Internet—feeds polarization by
creating markets for niche audiences.”95 If instead “this change in the
parties had occurred a half century ago, the dominant news media
might have moderated polarizing tendencies because of their interest
in appealing to a mass audience that crossed ideological lines.”96 In
today’s media scene, however, “partisanship pays.”97
The upshot of all this is that we are more divided than ever
before and—thanks to modern technology—we are listening to each
other less than ever before. It is no wonder that our constitutional
disputes have spawned alternative accounts about the way the world
works.
2. Growth and New Sophistication in Social Movements Seeking
Constitutional Change
The digital revolution and the advent of social media are not the
only new developments to be reckoned with when evaluating the fac-
tual component of constitutional law. Equally important is the change
in how constitutional cases are litigated today. Broadly speaking,
there are more groups with wider missions seeking to change the
course of constitutional law today, and, as demonstrated below, these
92 Id.; see also Patrick R. Miller & Pamela Johnston Conover, Red and Blue States of
Mind: Partisan Hostility and Voting in the United States, 68 POL. RES. Q. 225, 225 (2015)
(finding that the public has recently become socially polarized, meaning members of
different political parties increasingly dislike each other).
93 Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New
Evidence on Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 691 (2015).
94 Devins, supra note 90, at 755 n.59 (citing PEW RESEARCH CTR., ONLINE NEWS
AUDIENCES LARGER, MORE DIVERSE: NEWS AUDIENCES INCREASINGLY POLITICIZED 8
(June 8, 2004), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/215.pdf).
95 Id.
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groups have become much better at growing the factual dimensions of
their arguments.98
Charles Epp argued years ago that “the strength and character of
the support structure for litigation—social movements, legal advocacy
groups, available resources and financing for litigation, and a diverse
legal profession developing legal ideas and strategies—[is what] most
closely determined the intensity of [a] rights revolution” and constitu-
tional change.99 And if Epp is right that the legal profession can cause
constitutional change, one cannot close her eyes to relevant shifts in
tactics used by that legal profession to get what they want.
First, the number of public interest organizations who seek to
influence constitutional law appears to have grown dramatically in
recent years.100 By one count the number of such groups jumped over
one thousand percent from 1975 to 2004.101 Not only are there more
of these organizations, but even the older ones have grown tremen-
dously in staff size and budget. As Deborah Rhode explains, “[g]roups
that started with a few idealists, typewriters, and a Xerox machine are
now multimillion dollar institutions at the forefront of social
reform.”102
98 While others have documented the growth and influence of these litigating groups, I
believe I am the first to observe the marked increase in sophistication in factual strategies.
99 Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Support Structures and Constitutional Change: Teles,
Southworth, and the Conservative Legal Movement, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 516, 519
(2011) (citing CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 2–6, 199 (1998)).
100 See Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organization of Public
Interest Practice: 1975–2004, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1591, 1607–08 (2006) (noting that the number
of lawyers and non-lawyers employed by public interest law organizations has grown
dramatically since 1975); Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at
Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2028 (2008) (“Most of this nation’s leading public interest
law organizations are now in midlife; they have grown substantially in size and influence
since their formation beginning in the late 1960s.”); see also id. at 2032 (“The most obvious
change has been size. Over the last several decades, the number, scale, and diversity of
public interest legal organizations has markedly increased.”). For further discussion on the
growing influence of public interest organizations on constitutional law, see Paul M.
Collins Jr., Interest Groups in the Judicial Arena, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTEREST GROUP
POLITICS 454 (Matt Grossman ed., 2013).
101 Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 100, at 1605–06 (noting that there were eighty-six
“core” public interest organizations in 1975 and over a thousand in 2004). The authors of
this study point out that of course there is imprecision in how one counts “public interest
law organizations.” They define them as “organizations in the voluntary sector that employ
at least one lawyer at least part time, and whose activities (1) seek to produce significant
benefits for those who are external to the organization’s participants, and (2) involve at
least one adjudicatory strategy.” Id. at 1601. This concession about the difficulty in defining
the contours of “public interest law firms” pervades the literature. See, e.g., Ann
Southworth, What Is Public Interest Law? Empirical Perspectives on an Old Question, 62
DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 494–95 (2013).
102 Rhode, supra note 100, at 2028.
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Another obvious change in social movements seeking constitu-
tional change—besides their explosion in size—is in a greater variety
of missions. While social movements were once dominated by causes
traditionally on the left of the political spectrum (the NAACP being
the classic example), the last thirty years have brought a proliferation
of public interest groups promoting conservative causes as well.103
This “rise of the conservative legal movement”—closely aligned with
the success of the Federalist Society—has been quite influential in
changing constitutional conversations in the academy, the legal pro-
fession, and the courts.104
The “second generation” of conservative public interest litigants
has also changed direction on how to seek constitutional change.105 As
Steven Teles explains in his book, while the previous generation of
conservative litigators “had insisted on ‘judicial restraint,’” second
generation firms—groups like the Center for Individual Rights and
the Institute for Justice—instead have adopted a more strategic
approach to “actively us[e] courts to establish new or reinvigorate old
rights.”106 Ann Southworth makes a similar observation. She says that
conservative public interest firms “now frequently initiate litigation”
designed to “eliminate or diminish rights forged by liberal public
interest law groups.”107
This focus on warring litigation with social movements on both
sides systematically seeking constitutional change is “something of a
paradigm shift” from the Civil Rights Era days of the NAACP.108 The
change matters for our purposes because both sides are pushing
opposing factual narratives to the courts. And they are using some
specific new fact-savvy strategies to do so.109
103 See generally ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING
THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2008); STEVEN M.
TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL
OF THE LAW (2008).
104 SOUTHWORTH, supra note 103, at 12, 33 (discussing efforts by conservatives to “jump
into the public interest law game”); TELES, supra note 103, at 221 (“The changing profile of
conservative public interest law’s leaders went hand in hand with the growth of the
Federalist Society . . . .”).
105 See TELES, supra note 103, at 221 (noting that they learned “from the failures of
first-generation firms, and from the success of their liberal counterparts”).
106 Id.
107 SOUTHWORTH, supra note 103, at 35.
108 Hollis-Brusky, supra note 99, at 524.
109 See TELES, supra note 103, at 221 (noting that the new conservative generation has a
“more strategic approach to client selection,” is smart at “pick[ing] cases with the potential
to alter the nation’s constitutional debate,” and takes advantage of “the rising number of
conservatives in the legal academy” who have “the cultural, social, and human capital
essential to the peculiarities of legal politics”); Hollis-Brusky, supra note 99, at 527–28
(discussing the works of Epp, Southworth, and Teles).
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One growing movement strategy among these groups (conserva-
tive and liberal alike) is knowing which facts are necessary to press the
change in constitutional law that they want.110 This move involves
reading signals from the courts. Take, for example, 2013’s high stakes
case about public unions, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n.111
Under existing Supreme Court precedent, workers who are not mem-
bers of a union may still be charged a fee that pays for union activity
devoted to bargaining for workplace rights.112 Friedrichs was a case
created specifically to challenge this precedent under the First
Amendment; it was a lawsuit brought at an accelerated pace by the
Center for Individual Rights (a conservative public interest law
firm).113
The reason for the rush was a statement in a prior case by Justice
Alito suggesting the time was ripe for a change.114 The Center for
Individual Rights caught the hint.115 Terry Pell, the then-President of
that group, explains: “When we read Alito’s opinion in [Knox], we
saw it as an invitation to bring the 1st Amendment back to the
Supreme Court.”116 And they did just that. The Center filed a lawsuit
later that year and made unusual concessions in the district court in
order to fast-track the case to the Supreme Court as a vehicle for
Justice Alito to get his chance to change course constitutionally.117
110 See Anders Walker, Shotguns, Weddings, and Lunch Counters: Why Cultural Frames
Matter to Constitutional Law, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 345, 349–50 (2011) (identifying
several fact-based techniques “movement strategists” have used in recent cases seeking
constitutional change).
111 No. SAVC 13-676-JLS, 2013 WL 9825479 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013), aff’d, No. 13-
57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014), aff’d mem. by an equally divided court,
136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016). Although the case ended in a 4-4 tie in 2016, the Supreme Court
recently agreed to take the issue up again. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun.
Emps., Council 31, 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (mem.) (No.
16-1466).
112 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222–23 (1977).
113 Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Bring Me a Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/opinion/bring-me-a-case.html.
114 In a 2012 case, Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, Justice
Alito seemed to go out of his way to make the following statement: “[W]e do not revisit
today whether the court’s former cases have given adequate recognition to the critical First
Amendment rights at stake.” 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012). Justice Sonia Sotomayor caught that
wink and nod and did not like it: “To cast serious doubt on longstanding precedent,” she
wrote in a concurrence, “is a step we historically take only with the greatest caution and
reticence. To do so, as the majority does, on our own invitation and without adversarial
presentation is both unfair and unwise.” Id. at 328 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
115 See David G. Savage, Group Appeals Mandatory Union Fees to Supreme Court, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-0201-court-teachers-
union-20150201-story.html.
116 Id.
117 See Dahlia Lithwick, Public Sector Unions Just Dodged a Major Bullet at the
Supreme Court, SLATE (Mar. 29, 2016, 11:26 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/
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Adam Liptak of the New York Times says this is a trend: cases
like Friedrichs, he reports, “are creations of legal entrepreneurs” who
are paying attention “to signals from justices who have done more
than wait for cases to arrive at their courthouse.”118
Liptak is not the only one noticing a pattern. Reading judicial
signals is something public interest law firms are getting quite good at
doing.119 As political scientist Vanessa Baird points out, public interest
groups (like the Center for Individual Rights on the right or the
ACLU on the left) “use information from previous [judicial] decisions
about how case facts can be used to make particular legal arguments
that can help them push the envelope of legal change.”120 Reading the
tea leaves like this helps clever legal strategists decide to spend money
“scour[ing] the environment for cases with appropriate case facts that
lend themselves to sophisticated and policy relevant legal arguments,
and then support the litigation of the cases so that they are available
to the Court.”121
The same strategists that know what facts make good vehicles for
their causes also know how to develop those facts in a way that
attracts judicial attention once the case is born. This involves first
finding what has been called the right “frame” for a legal dispute, and
then making sure the “right” expert authorities are in place to cement
that factual frame for the judges.122
2016/03/29/public_sectors_unions_dodge_a_bullet_at_the_supreme_court.html (calling
Friedrichs litigation “on the fast track”).
118 Adam Liptak, With Subtle Signals, Supreme Court Justices Request the Cases They
Want to Hear, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/07/us/supreme-
court-sends-signals-to-request-cases-they-want-to-hear.html?_r=0.
119 See generally VANESSA A. BAIRD, ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: HOW
JUSTICES AND LITIGANTS SET THE SUPREME COURT AGENDA (2007) (connecting
“litigants’ strategies with the aggregate policy trends on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
agenda”); Vanessa Baird & Tonja Jacobi, Judicial Agenda Setting Through Signaling and
Strategic Litigant Responses, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215 (2009) (discussing research on
judicial signaling and litigant responsiveness).
120 Baird & Jacobi, supra note 119, at 219.
121 Id. at 222. Indeed, another success story for this new generation of conservative
public interest litigators is District of Columbia v. Heller, the landmark 2008 decision
holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to own a handgun. 554
U.S. 570, 635 (2008). That case was brought by litigators at the Cato Institute and the
Institute of Justice at the not-so-subtle request by Justice Thomas that he hoped to have
the opportunity to decide that issue “at some future date.” See Hollis-Brusky, supra note
99, at 530–31 (discussing Heller and Justice Thomas’s signaling in Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997)). Taking this hint and running with it, the conservative litigators
“responded and brought a well-framed, well-argued, and successful challenge to the
District of Columbia’s hand-gun ban.” Id. at 531.
122 See Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901,
1921 (2016) (discussing the importance of experts in Supreme Court cases); Mary Ziegler,
Framing Change: Cause Lawyering, Constitutional Decisions, and Social Change, 94
MARQ. L. REV. 263, 279–81 (2011) (discussing the importance of framing).
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Litigation over same-sex marriage bans provides an instructive
example here. As historians have documented, the litigants in the
struggle for marriage equality shifted argument strategies around the
mid-2000s to stress “civil- and equal-rights rhetoric” as opposed to
pure privacy concerns.123 This move brought several advantages to the
movement, including shifting the factual debate in a way that forced
opponents to prove—as a matter of fact—that same-sex couples were
somehow unequal parents.124
These questions of fact then became prominent in the second-
wave of marriage litigation. In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the case chal-
lenging the same-sex marriage ban in California,125 Ted Olson (a lead
lawyer for the challengers) knew the drill. He first advised finding
plaintiffs who were “in long-term committed relationships . . . . ‘I want
a teacher, a police officer, and someone who owns a bookstore,’” he is
quoted as saying.126
Beyond selecting the “right” plaintiffs, Olson and the other liti-
gators fighting for marriage equality also knew that there were big
generalized factual questions that would need to be answered, and
they worked hard to get their experts up front.127 The litigation in
California actually went to a trial in which these generalized claims of
fact were put to the test.128 Judge Walker, the district court judge,
heard testimony from over a dozen witnesses (expert and lay) on fac-
tual questions, such as: Whether sexual orientation is an immutable
123 Ziegler, supra note 122, at 301. I need to be clear that the movement lawyers on this
issue did not have a monopoly like, for example, the NAACP did with respect to school
segregation in the South. See NAACP Legal History, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/legal-
department/naacp-legal-history/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2017) (noting that the NAACP’s
origins date back to 1909). The LGBT movement lawyers were “plenty strategic” but just
had less control over the litigation due to the plethora of lawyers willing to take such a
case. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 217 (2013) (stating that gay rights
litigators have lacked control over gay marriage litigation compared to the NAACP with
regard to school desegregation litigation).
124 See Ziegler, supra note 122, at 302 (discussing shifts in opponents’ strategies in 1996,
2003, and 2006). As Michael Klarman demonstrates in his book on the subject, this move
also had a significant effect on public opinion. See KLARMAN, supra note 123, at 210 (“One
can only guess how many people have changed their attitudes toward gay marriage after
experiencing gay married couples as good neighbors or as parents of well-adjusted
children.”).
125 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659–60 (2013).
126 JO BECKER, FORCING THE SPRING: INSIDE THE FIGHT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY 22
(2014).
127 See id. at 55–58 (describing how litigation strategy evolved once it was realized facts
would need to be proven at trial).
128 See KENJI YOSHINO, SPEAK NOW: MARRIAGE EQUALITY ON TRIAL 199 (2015)
(discussing considerable time spent by plaintiffs and defendants in presenting their case
and cross-examining witnesses).
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trait, whether permitting same-sex marriage will cause a reduction in
heterosexual marriage, and the effect of having two parents of the
same gender on a child’s development.129 The court ultimately ruled
for the challengers making over eighty findings of fact on issues of this
sort, complete with citations to testimony from the record.130 Writing
about the trial, Kenji Yoshino describes the findings of fact in Judge
Walker’s opinion as “the language of power. The words were bricks
on the page; the pages were the walls of a citadel.”131
And even though Perry was not the case that ultimately brought
same-sex marriage bans to an end, history shows that shifting the fac-
tual controversy to issues involving children and equality was the right
strategy. Justice Kennedy’s opinions in United States v. Windsor and
later Obergefell v. Hodges emphasized principles of equality and con-
cerns for children being raised by gay couples who were taught that
their families were somehow less worthy of state recognition.132 It
turns out the shift of factual frame to emphasize family and equality
was a winning move. And it was no accident, but rather the product of
sophisticated lawyers seeking constitutional change.
Of course, the emphasis on finding the appropriate frame and
factual record for a constitutional case does not stop at trial. More and
more frequently these days, the factual contours of a constitutional
case are presented in briefs filed on appeal by outside experts as amici
curiae, or “friends of the court.”133 This is one strategy movement law-
yers use for spreading what they call the “intellectual capital” neces-
sary for change in constitutional law.134 In Friedrichs, for example,
even though the factual record below was basically non-existent, the
Center for Individual Rights secured assistance of nine amicus briefs
129 Although having a trial on questions like this may seem unusual, many praised the
move. As Kenji Yoshino says in his book documenting the trial: “Claims that might seem
unassailable in a thirty-second spot on television could be dismantled through hours of
methodical questioning in the dock.” Id. at 158.
130 Id. at 234.
131 Id.
132 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603–07 (2015) (citing the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689–96 (2013) (discussing due process and equal protection principles).
133 I have written extensively on the subject of amicus briefs before, noting their rise in
recent years both in terms of the number of briefs filed and also the number of briefs cited
by the Court. See Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, supra note 16, at 1758 (noting
that “[a]micus curiae briefs filed at the U.S. Supreme Court are on the rise—up 8000%
over 50 years”); Larsen & Devins, supra note 122, at 1911, 1915 (noting “an explosion of
amicus briefs routinely filed at the Court”).
134 “Intellectual capital” was a phrase used by Steve Teles to describe an important new
strategy of the second generation of conservative public interest law firms. TELES, supra
note 103, at 199; see also Hollis-Brusky, supra note 99, at 532 (connecting this strategy to
the rise of amicus briefs).
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at the cert petition stage and twenty-five such briefs on the merits. By
my count fifty-six percent of these briefs included at least one whole
section or over ten authorities devoted to factual claims, such as
empirical data on whether collective bargaining lowers strike rates
and whether unions can exist without agency fees.135
And Friedrichs is not unusual. Amicus briefs have had a tremen-
dous growth spurt at the Supreme Court in the last twenty years, and
the sophisticated advocates of today know how to use them.136 As I
have written about before with my colleague Neal Devins, advocates
at the Court “wrangle” the amicus experts they think would influence
the justices and then “whisper” to them to make sure they are saying
what needs to be said.137 A targeted amicus strategy is seen by those
in the know to be a necessity not a luxury, and those briefs are
increasingly responsible for marshalling factual authorities to the
courts.
It is now common for any one case at the Supreme Court to draw
dozens of amicus briefs.138 And it is becoming more common for the
brief count to climb even higher than that. District of Columbia v.
Heller drew sixty-eight briefs of amicus support, Whole Women’s
Health drew eighty such briefs, and Obergefell v. Hodges set the
record with 153 briefs by amicus curiae. For the sake of comparison
historically, consider that Brown v. Board of Education had just six
amicus briefs and Roe v. Wade had only twenty-three.139
What is even more noteworthy, however, is the percentage of
those amicus briefs that dedicate a significant portion of their pages to
factual claims.140 In District of Columbia v. Heller, for example, nearly
half of the amicus briefs devoted a section or more of their briefs to
arguments involving legislative fact—arguments like those presenting
“criminological evidence” in an attempt to “discredit[ ] the mantra
135 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Mackinac Center for Public Policy in Support of
Petitioners at 6–10, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2006) (mem.) (per
curiam) (No. 14-915) (discussing the relationship between agency fees and exclusive
bargaining in the public sector); Brief of Steve Bullock, Governor of Montana, as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 13–15, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915)
(similar). For a list of briefs coded as “fact-y,” please see spreadsheets on file with the
N.Y.U. Law Review.
136 Larsen & Devins, supra note 122, at 1912.
137 See id. at 1919–26 (discussing the “amicus wrangler” and “amicus whisperer”).
138 See id. at 1902 (noting that “marquee cases” attract “briefs in the triple digits”).
139 Id. at 1912.
140 A word on methodology: In reaching this number, I define significant to mean
devoting one entire roman numeral section to claims of legislative fact or to citing ten or
more factual authorities. For a complete list of sorted cases, see spreadsheets on file with
N.Y.U. Law Review.
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more guns = more violence and death.”141 And in Whole Woman’s
Health, a case where sixty-three percent of the briefs were largely
devoted to claims of legislative fact,142 competing groups of obstetri-
cians as amici made completely opposite medical claims about the
inherent risks of the abortion procedure.143
As I have observed before, the Justices seem hungry for this sort
of factual information and they are increasingly turning to amici to get
it.144 There is value, certainly, to providing the Court with factual
expertise—particularly when modern Justices seem more interested in
laying down broad rules than just deciding specific disputes. But there
is also a downside to advocates funneling factual arguments in their
amicus briefs particularly those who are pushing an agenda and sur-
rounded by “my team-your team” facts at all times. Just as “law-office
history” tends to be one-sided and advocacy-driven,145 so too should
we worry about “law-office medicine” or “law-office social science” or
“law-office description of police practices.” It is a concern made more
acute by the boom in amicus practice, the eager participation by
experts and pseudo-experts in all fields, and the increasing sophistica-
tion of advocates and activists who know where to find them.146
141 Brandeis Brief Filed on Behalf of Amici Frederick Bieber et al. Supporting
Appellants at 3, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).
142 For a complete list of the coded briefs in this case, see spreadsheets on file with
N.Y.U. Law Review.
143 Compare Brief of Amici Curiae American Ass’n of Pro-Life Obstetricians &
Gynecologists et al. in Support of Respondents at 6–17, Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274) (alleging that both surgical and drug-
induced abortions are significantly associated with risks of major complications and death),
with Brief for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists et al. in
Support of Petitioners at 6–10, Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274)
(stating that abortions are extremely safe medical procedures with exceptionally low death
rates).
144 See Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, supra note 16, at 1778–79 (arguing that
the Justices now “treat amici as experts, not as a research tool”); Larsen & Devins, supra
note 122, at 1953 (pointing to the Roberts Court’s “willingness to appoint amici curiae to
argue issues raised by the Justices”).
145 I believe the phrase “law-office history” was coined by Alfred Kelly, who explained
that “[b]y ‘law-office history,’ I mean the selection of data favorable to the position being
advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper evaluation of the
data proffered.” Wendie Ellen Schneider, Case Note, Past Imperfect, 110 YALE L.J. 1531,
1542 (2001) (quoting Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP.
CT. REV. 119, 122 n.13).
146 Neal Devins and I have written in the past about the value members of the Supreme
Court bar bring to the amicus practice in our article The Amicus Machine. See generally
Larsen & Devins, supra note 122. As I explain there, I maintain my concern about an
unbridled amicus practice, but I believe that the risks can be mitigated by the reputation
market created by elite members of the Supreme Court bar. Id. at 1901. For the same
reasons, I am less concerned by that particular circle of advocates propelling and endorsing
alternative facts.
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At the end of the day whether through careful case selection or
choosing smart factual frames or recruiting the right experts at trial
and as amici, the second generation of social movement lawyers are
quite advanced at growing the factual dimensions of their cases in a
way that sets them up for successful constitutional arguments. It is
another part of what makes the “fact-y” turn in U.S. constitutional law
so dramatic, and it sets the stage for a collision with alternative facts in
an undesirable way.
II
EXAMPLES OF ALTERNATIVE FACTS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
Alternative facts disturbing Thanksgiving dinner conversations
are one thing. It is another thing to talk about whether these facts
affect the interpretation of our Constitution. As demonstrated below,
they can and they do. This Part discusses examples of current constitu-
tional controversies in which judges are besieged by “my team-your
team” facts: two different sets of authorities coming to opposite con-
clusions about the way the world works. These facts are not just being
used rhetorically but are seemingly central to the outcome of the case.
And, as explored below, some of these “facts” are simply untrue.
A. Restrictions on Abortion
Alternative facts are perhaps most rampant around laws that
restrict access to abortion. Following the Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey decision in 1992, states are per-
mitted to enact restrictions on abortion procedures so long as such
laws do not impose an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to choose
to end her pregnancy before fetal viability.147 In the twenty-five years
or so since Casey, such laws have been enacted at an aggressive
pace.148 Indeed, by one count more than 300 of these laws were intro-
duced in state legislatures since 2010 alone.149 And, as demonstrated
147 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874–77 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (defining “undue burden” as “a state regulation [that] has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus”).
148 See, e.g., An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2017), https://
www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws (listing abortion laws
concerning the requirements of performance by a licensed physician, hospital
requirements, private and public funding limits, mandated counseling, waiting periods, and
parental involvement for minors seeking abortions).
149 See Sarah Lipton-Lubet, Opinion, “Alternative Facts” and the Anti-Abortion
Movement, HILL (Jan. 27, 2017, 7:40 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/civil-rights/
316428-the-anti-abortion-movement-a-match-made-in-alternative-fact (noting that nearly
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below, plenty of this legislation (and subsequent litigation) has been
infected with factual claims that are of dubious reliability.150
In this Section, I discuss three varieties of abortion restrictions
surrounded by controversy on questions of fact: (1) “informed con-
sent” laws that require disclosure to patients of certain risks that abor-
tion is said to carry, (2) regulations on abortion providers (such as
requiring doctors to have admitting privileges in local hospitals), and
(3) “fetal pain laws” or laws that ban abortion at twenty weeks on the
grounds that the fetus is capable of feeling pain at that point.
1. Informed Consent Laws
One strategy in restricting abortion is to regulate the mandatory
counseling a woman must receive before undergoing an abortion pro-
cedure. Seven states require providers to inform women that having
an abortion can have negative mental health consequences including
specifically mentioning (in some states) the risk of suicide or depres-
sion.151 Four states provide information to women telling them that
having an abortion can jeopardize her future fertility.152 And six states
require informing women that having an abortion could increase the
risk of breast cancer.153
None of these claims withstand medical scrutiny. The National
Cancer Institute convened a group of one hundred of the world’s
one-third of the more than 1100 abortion restrictions enacted by states have been adopted
since 2010).
150 See infra Section II.A.1–3.
151 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6710(a)(3) (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.16(D)
(West 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.17015(11)(b)(iii) (West Supp. 2017); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-327.01(1)(b) (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.82(1)(b) (West Supp.
2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(i), (ii) (Supp. 2017); W. VA. CODE § 16-
2I-3(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2016); see also Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/
counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion (categorizing state abortion laws based on
different included provisions).
152 Those four states are: Arizona, Kansas, South Dakota, and Texas. See GUTTMACHER
INST., supra note 151 (noting that the four states inaccurately portray risks regarding future
fertility); see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2017)
(requiring notice of the potential risk of infertility for consent to an abortion to be
voluntary and informed); ARIZ. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS., A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW
15, http://www.azdhs.gov/documents/prevention/womens-childrens-health/informed-
consent/a-womans-right-to-know.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) (including information on
future fertility in state materials given to abortion patients); KAN. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
ENV’T, IF YOU ARE PREGNANT 18, 19, 22, 26, http://www.womansrighttoknow.org/
download/Handbook_English.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) (same).
153 For Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, Texas, Alaska, and Oklahoma, see the
statutes and material listed, supra note 5. There are of course variations in the language
required. For details and a state-by-state breakdown of the information mandated in the
informed consent, see GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 148.
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leading experts who study pregnancy and breast cancer risk. They con-
clusively determined that “having an abortion or miscarriage does not
increase a woman’s subsequent risk of developing breast cancer.”154
Similarly, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists in
2015 concluded that having one abortion had no adverse effect on
future fertility or pregnancy complications.155
Further, the psychological effect of abortion is a subject also sur-
rounded by claims of questionable reliability. Consider, for example, a
man named Vincent Rue. Rue has been a frequent expert in abortion
restriction cases—both in court and before legislatures.156 Rue is not a
medical doctor but holds an advanced degree in home economics. He
is the inventor of the phrase “post-abortion syndrome,” a label used
to describe alleged adverse psychological effects women experience
following abortion.157 According to Rue, abortion triggers psycholog-
ical effects similar to those felt by soldiers after war in post-traumatic
stress disorder.158
Rue’s research has been widely discredited by the American Psy-
chology Association, which has flatly denied any connection between
154 Abortion, Miscarriage, and Breast Cancer Risk: 2003 Workshop, NAT’L CANCER
INST. (Jan. 12, 2010), https://www.cancer.gov/types/breast/abortion-miscarriage-risk.
155 See Frequently Asked Questions: Induced Abortion, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNECOLOGISTS (May 2015), http://www.acog.org/Patients/FAQs/Induced-Abortion
(“Most health care providers agree that one abortion does not affect your ability to get
pregnant or the risk of future pregnancy complications.”); see also Hani K. Atrash & Carol
J. Rowland Hogue, The Effect of Pregnancy Termination on Future Reproduction, 4
BAILLIE`RE’S CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 391, 392 (1990) (finding that
generally no significantly increased risks of adverse reproductive health following induced
abortion have been observed); Peter Frank et al., The Effect of Induced Abortion on
Subsequent Fertility, 100 BRITISH J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 575 (1993) (finding that
induced abortions are not related to future fertility); Yvonne Butler Tobah, Could an
Abortion Increase the Risk of Problems in a Subsequent Pregnancy?, MAYO CLINIC:
HEALTHY LIFESTYLE (July 19, 2017), http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/getting-
pregnant/expert-answers/abortion/faq-20058551 (“Generally, elective abortion isn’t
thought to cause fertility issues . . . .”).
156 See Irin Carmon, Who Is Vincent Rue?, MSNBC (June 11, 2014), http://www.msnbc
.com/msnbc/who-vincent-rue (profiling Vincent Rue).
157 Id.
158 See Priscilla K. Coleman, Catherine T. Coyle, Martha Shuping & Vincent M. Rue,
Induced Abortion and Anxiety, Mood, and Substance Abuse Disorders: Isolating the Effects
of Abortion in the National Comorbidity Survey, 43 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 770, 775 (2009)
(“The results of this study revealed that women who have aborted are at a higher risk for a
variety of mental health problems . . . when compared to women without a history of
abortion . . . .”); see also Emily Bazelon, Is There a Post-Abortion Syndrome?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Jan. 21, 2007), https://nyti.ms/2k9Cm21 (“This way of thinking was first articulated
in the early 1980s. Vincent Rue, a family therapist and ally of Reardon’s, testified before
Congress in 1981 about a variant of post-traumatic stress disorder that he claimed was
afflicting women—‘post-abortion syndrome.’”).
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abortion and adverse mental health.159 Indeed, a journal in which
Rue’s research was published was forced to issue a retraction after his
study was debunked by psychologists at the University of California,
who did not mince words when calling Rue’s research flawed: “This is
not a scholarly difference of opinion; their facts were flatly wrong.
This was an abuse of the scientific process to reach conclusions that
are not supported by the data.”160 Even Ronald Reagan’s surgeon
general, C. Everett Koop, a conservative and pro-life supporter,
refused to credit Rue’s research—reporting back to his boss that he
was unconvinced by the data on the mental health effects of abortion
on women.161
But even after Rue’s research has been widely discredited—and
recognized as such by several district courts who threw out his testi-
mony as unreliable162—he continues to hold influence behind the
scenes. Although he no longer testifies in court, Rue has recently been
paid a total of over $192,000 to testify about the supposedly harmful
effects of abortion on women’s health before legislatures in Texas,
Wisconsin, Alabama, and North Dakota.163
Furthermore, Rue has been hired to “consult” and to “ghost-
write” expert testimony from other people in constitutional litigation
159 See generally BRENDA MAJOR ET AL., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE
APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION (2008), http://www.apa.org/pi/
women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf (“The best scientific evidence published
indicates that among adult women who have an unplanned pregnancy the relative risk of
mental health problems is no greater if they have a single elective first-trimester abortion
than if they deliver that pregnancy.”).
160 Carmon, supra note 156 (quoting Jane Steinberg, assistant professor in the
Department of Psychiatry at University of California-San Diego); see Julia R. Steinberg &
Lawrence B. Finer, Examining the Association of Abortion History and Current Mental
Health: A Reanalysis of the National Comorbidity Survey Using Common-Risk-Factors
Model, 72 SOC. SCI. & MED. 72 (2011) (debunking Coleman, Coyle, Shuping, and Rue’s
study).
161 Carmon, supra note 156.
162 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1333–34 (E.D.
Pa. 1990) (finding that Vincent Rue’s testimony was “not credible,” “devoid of the
analytical force and scientific rigor which typified the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert
psychologist,” and “suggest[ed] a possible personal bias”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 947
F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 768 (D. Minn. 1986) (finding that Vincent Rue “possesse[d]
neither the academic qualifications nor the professional experience of plaintiffs’ expert
witnesses” and that “his testimony lacked the analytical force of” and was “less persuasive
than” plaintiffs’ expert testimony), rev’d on other grounds, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988).
163 Molly Redden, Texas Pays “Thoroughly Discredited” Expert $42,000 to Defend Anti-
Abortion Law, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 13, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2014/08/texas-vincent-rue-anti-abortion-law/; see also Carmon, supra note 156
(describing Rue’s behind the scenes work in recruiting and consulting expert witnesses).
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about these abortion laws.164 Rue’s undercover influence, in fact, has
been revealed on cross-examination in several recent constitutional
trials. One district judge, Judge Yeakel in Texas, admitted e-mail cor-
respondence to show how the state’s psychological expert was being
coached by Rue as she prepared her testimony.165 In similar litigation
in Alabama, the state’s expert admitted on cross examination to using
Rue for help in “wordsmithing” his testimony.166 And a district court
in Wisconsin also found Rue’s behind the scenes influence to be a
liability.167
The fact that Rue’s fingerprints have been discovered by vigilant
district courts is cause for optimism (and discussed in Part III and IV
below), but the fact remains that this widely discredited “science” has
still held influence in laws that affect the constitutional rights of mil-
lions of citizens.
2. Regulations on Abortion Providers
Another type of abortion restrictions are regulations on the insti-
tutions that seek to offer abortion services. Called “Targeted Regula-
tion of Abortion Providers” or “TRAP” laws by critics,168 these laws
“singl[e] out abortion providers for onerous regulation concerning
building standards, licensing, telemedicine, and admitting privileges,”
and they “work either to raise the cost of providing abortions or to put
providers out of business altogether.”169 All of these regulations are
passed in the name of protecting the health of women.170
But, as Reva Siegel and Linda Greenhouse have observed at
length—and as several district courts have found—there are reasons
to be skeptical about the factual claims underlying these regulations
164 Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 973 n.24 (W.D.
Wis. 2015).
165 Redden, supra note 163.
166 Id.
167 See Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 973 n.24 (noting that the weight given to
defendant’s expert was called into question in part because he “had been actively recruited
by Dr. Vincent Rue”).
168 Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes:
Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 YALE L.J.F. 149, 151
(2016), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-difference-a-whole-woman-makes.
169 Id.
170 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 789 (7th Cir.
2013) (referencing the stated rationale of a Wisconsin TRAP law “to protect the health of
women who have abortions”); Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d 1272,
1298 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (referencing Alabama’s purpose of passing a TRAP law to
“further[ ] women’s health”); State Defendants’ Trial Brief at 42, Planned Parenthood of
Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (No.
1:13-CV-862) (referencing Texas’s TRAP laws’ purpose “to protect the health and safety of
patients”).
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on abortion providers.171 These restrictions are said to be necessary to
keep abortion safe. In reality, however, the overwhelming medical
consensus is that abortion procedures are extremely safe already: less
than 0.3% of U.S. abortion patients experience a complication that
requires hospitalization.172 “And in the unlikely event of an emer-
gency, federal law requires a hospital to treat a woman, regardless of
whether the abortion provider has admitting privileges at that
facility.”173
This fact—about the rate of abortion complications—is another
one that has been the subject of some shenanigans. Consider the sta-
tistics submitted by expert Dr. John Thorp in several cases involving
regulation of abortion providers. Thorp has testified before several
state legislatures and courts about the complication rate for abortions,
which he says fall somewhere “between 2 and 10 percent.”174 The
problem, however, is that on cross examination in a 2014 case,
Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Van Hollen, Thorp admitted that
he had omitted a decimal point and the real risk was somewhere
between 0.2 and 10 percent. True, the missing decimal point could
have been an honest mistake.175 But there is reason to be skeptical
since Thorp made the same decimal mistake (and was caught in a dep-
osition) in a different case in Alabama in 2013.176
The constitutional litigation over TRAP laws in the courts has
been on a bit of a roller coaster, as illustrated by the fate of HB2 in
Texas. This law required that abortion providers have admitting privi-
leges at a nearby hospital and be equipped as ambulatory surgical cen-
ters (an expensive requirement).177 Judge Lee Yeakel of the Western
District of Texas found in Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey that prior
to the admitting privileges law in Texas “abortion in Texas was
171 See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 168, at 153 (citing Whole Woman’s Health v.
Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684, 687–88 (W.D. Tex. 2014)); see also Linda Greenhouse &
Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When Protecting Health Obstructs Choice,
125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1454 (2016) (describing “deep questions about whether evidence
supports the alleged benefits to women’s health” proposed in TRAP laws).
172 See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d 858, 863 (W.D.
Wis. 2013) (referencing studies cited by Dr. Douglas Laube “demonstrating that legal
abortion is one of the safest medical procedures in the United States”).
173 Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, Flouting the Facts: State Abortion
Restrictions Flying in the Face of Science, 20 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 53, 54 (2017).
174 For the entire story of Thorp’s testimony, see Imani Gandy, When Does an Error
Become a Lie? The Case of the Missing Decimal Point, REWIRE (Apr. 24, 2015, 11:07 AM),
https://rewire.news/article/2015/04/24/error-becomes-lie-missing-decimal-point/.
175 Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 968–69 (W.D.
Wis. 2015).
176 Gandy, supra note 174 (discussing Thorp’s deposition in Planned Parenthood Se.,
Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2014)).
177 H.B. 2, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 5013, 5017 (West).
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extremely safe” and that the regulations were not just unnecessary but
also “would effect[ ] the closing of almost all abortion clinics in
Texas.”178
The district court’s fact-checking here was quite detailed. Fol-
lowing a trial and expert witness credibility determinations the court
found that the law had the effect of reducing abortion providers in the
state by eighty percent.179 It also found that “[t]he great weight of the
evidence demonstrate[d]” that abortion was “extremely safe” before
the passage of HB2 and that there was a “dearth of credible evidence”
that ambulatory centers were necessary to protect women’s health.180
The Fifth Circuit reversed Judge Yeakel (a George W. Bush
appointee)—citing deference to the legislative record.181 But the U.S.
Supreme Court vindicated the trial court in 2016, holding in Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt that the “undue burden” standard gov-
erning abortion restrictions demands “close attention to the scientific
evidence” behind the law.182 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,
was explicit that courts have a role in fact-checking laws like this:
“[T]he ‘Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review
factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake.’”183 As Linda
Greenhouse and Reva Siegel describe it, the Court’s opinion “is rich
with factual findings of the district court and of amici that bear on the
balance of benefits and burdens in the case.”184 Ultimately concluding
that the law achieved “little or no health benefits,” while at the same
time “adversely affect[ing] women’s access” to abortion, the Court
once again anchored constitutional law in factual claims, but this time
showed an increased willingness to scrutinize them.185
3. Fetal Pain Laws
A final example of abortion restrictions that rest on factual claims
of questionable reliability concern laws that ban abortion earlier than
viability based on evidence that the fetus can feel pain earlier in the
178 Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684, 687 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
179 See id. at 680–81 (stating that the number of licensed abortion facilities would go
from forty to “at most, eight”).
180 Id. at 684–85.
181 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 297 (5th Cir.) (“In our circuit, we
do not balance the wisdom or effectiveness of a law against the burdens the law imposes.”),
vacated in part by 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (mem.).
182 Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 168, at 150; see also Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016) (finding that the district court’s consideration of
scientific witness credibility was appropriate).
183 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007)).
184 Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 168, at 156.
185 Id. at 158.
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pregnancy. Twenty-week abortion bans have been enacted in twenty-
one states to date.186 Arizona passed one such law in 2012, forbidding
abortion after twenty weeks except in a medical emergency.187
Despite the concession that twenty weeks is before fetus viability—
the line at which abortion is constitutionally protected—the Arizona
Legislature justifies its law in part by citing “the strong medical evi-
dence that unborn children feel pain during an abortion at that gesta-
tional age.”188
In Issacson v. Horne, the Ninth Circuit struck down the Arizona
law on the grounds that it was flatly inconsistent with Roe v. Wade.189
But interestingly neither the Ninth Circuit nor the district court
engaged with the factual premise behind the law—the claim that a
fetus can feel pain before twenty weeks.
When one digs a little, however, it is far from obvious that this
factual claim is indeed true. The “strong medical evidence” relied on
by the Arizona Legislature and assumed to be true by the reviewing
courts actually amounts to one medical study published in 1987.190
The rest of the legislative record assembled by Arizona does not con-
cern fetal pain at all.191
And the 1987 study is counter-balanced by some serious contrary
authority. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
for example, relying on “recent systematic reviews of the existing
research published in peer-reviewed journals,” rejects the claim that
the fetus can feel pain that early in a pregnancy.192 And the consensus
of the American Medical Association is that “[e]vidence regarding the
capacity for fetal pain is limited but indicates that fetal perception of
186 The states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 20-Week
Bans, REWIRE: LEGIS. TRACKER, https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law-topic/20-week-
bans/ (last updated Oct. 10, 2017). Laws in three of those states have been blocked by
federal courts.
187 H.R. 2036, 2012 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1346, 1364 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-2159 (2014)).
188 Issacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting H.R. 2036 § 9(B)(1)).
189 See id. at 1217 (“Arizona’s twenty-week law is a preclusion prior to fetal viability and
is thus invalid under binding Supreme Court precedent.”).
190 See H.R. 2036 § 9(A)(7) (showing that the only study relating to fetal pain laws is
K.J.S. Anand & P.R. Hickey, Pain and Its Effects in the Human Neonate and Fetus, 317
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1321 (1987)).
191 H.R. 2036.
192 Motion of American College of Obstetrics & Gynecologists & American Congress of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants
at 21, Isaacson, 716 F.3d 1213 (No. 12-16670).
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pain is unlikely before the third trimester.”193 Given the mixed
authority (and perhaps that is a generous characterization), one has to
question the choice to label one 1987 study as “strong medical evi-
dence” sufficient to justify infringing a constitutionally protected right.
B. Voter ID Laws
“My team-your team” facts plague constitutional controversies
well beyond the abortion debate. Recent years have seen a flurry of
state laws that seek to tighten procedural requirements before voting,
particularly those commonly known as “voter ID laws.” In 2006, only
three states required identification before voting.194 Just over ten
years later, thirty-four states now require some form of identification
before voting, and eight of those states have “strict” voter ID laws
that require the ID to contain a photograph.195
This wave of legislative reform is fueled by a concern that elec-
tions in the United States are tainted by voting fraud.196 Proponents of
these laws see voter ID requirements as a way to fix the problem.197
Challengers argue that these laws are not necessary and that they
infringe the fundamental right to vote, specifically suppressing the
rights of minority and low-income voters who are less likely to have a
photo ID.198
The fight has a distinctly partisan flavor: “Republicans strongly
favor voter ID laws as a way to prevent voter fraud while Democrats
oppose them as a crass partisan tactic to suppress turnout among their
strongest supporters.”199 Indeed, of the new state voter ID laws
between 2005 and 2007, ninety-five percent of Republican legislators
193 Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence,
294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 947, 947 (2005) (carrying the endorsement by the AMA through
publication in JAMA, the AMA’s own journal); see also LEVITAN, supra note 7, at 11–13
(“Several reviews of available evidence, conducted by well-respected scientific
organizations, have concluded that the insistence on pain at 20 weeks is misplaced.”).
194 See Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 639 (2007)
(showing that the three states that required photo identification were Georgia, Indiana,
and Missouri).
195 See Voter Identification Requirements Report, NAT. CTR FOR ST. CTS, (January 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx; Terri Peretti, Judicial
Partisanship in Voter Identification Litigation, 15 ELECTION L.J. 214, 215 & n.3 (2016); see
also Michael D. Gilbert, The Problem of Voter Fraud, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 744 & n.18
(2015) (noting that thirty-four states have passed voter ID laws but not all have taken
effect).
196 See Peretti, supra note 195, at 214 (citing “[i]rregularities in the administration of the
2000 presidential election” as triggering these concerns).
197 See Gilbert, supra note 195, at 744 (“The target (or some would say ‘alleged’ target)
of strict voter ID laws is voter fraud.” (footnote omitted)).
198 Id. at 741.
199 Peretti, supra note 195, at 215.
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voted in favor of them, while only two percent of Democratic legisla-
tors did so.200
And the partisan fight seems to continue in the courtroom.
Almost as quickly as voter ID laws are being enacted, constitutional
challenges have followed. The outcome of such cases falls into a con-
spicuous pattern. As political scientist Terri Peretti recently docu-
mented, there is “a striking partisan divide” in these cases with judges
appointed by Democrats skeptical of voter ID laws and judges
appointed by Republicans more likely to uphold them.201 Peretti
found “that nearly three-quarters of all judicial votes in voter identifi-
cation cases (107 out of 145) are partisan in the sense that those votes
conform to the position of the party to which the judge belongs.”202
One might be tempted to rush to the conclusion that the judges in
these cases are acting as “partisan zealots” and prioritizing party loy-
alty over other legal commitments.203 Resist that temptation. Dan
Kahan argues that a more likely explanation has to do with “[t]he
essentially factual nature of the disagreement,” and the effect of sub-
conscious “cultural cognition” on the assessment of those facts.204
“Cultural cognition,” Kahan explains, “refers to the influence of
group values—ones relating to equality and authority, individualism
and community—on risk perceptions and related beliefs.”205 Recall
that Kahan’s work demonstrates that people tend to “endorse which-
ever position reinforces their connection to others with whom they
share important commitments.”206
In terms of the voter ID dispute, Kahan argues, the partisan
divide can be explained by judges “sincerely basing their decisions on
their views of the law,” but in a way that reflects “subconscious, extra-
legal influences on their perception of legally consequential facts.”207
It is more than plausible that on questions of fact—like whether voter
fraud is rampant and whether voter ID laws suppress votes—we
should “expect judges, like everyone else, to gravitate toward the fac-
200 Id.
201 Id. at 214.
202 Id. at 224.
203 Peretti also resists this conclusion. See id. at 225 (“This finding of a close link
between a judge’s partisan affiliation and her decisions in voter ID cases does not
necessarily mean that judges are crassly favoring their party’s policy goals and electoral
interests.”).
204 Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology in” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging: What Difference
Does it Make?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413, 417 (2009).
205 Kahan, supra note 86, at 296; see also Kahan, supra note 204, at 418 (comparing how
people with individualistic values and egalitarian values differ).
206 Kahan, supra note 86, at 296.
207 Kahan, supra note 204, at 417.
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tual beliefs that are most congenial to their defining commitments.”208
Peretti puts it a little more colorfully:
Republican judges may watch FOX News and honestly believe that
voter fraud is rampant and should be addressed with corrective leg-
islation, while Democratic judges may watch MSNBC and honestly
believe that voter fraud is a myth that Republicans advance in order
to suppress voter turnout among young, poor, and minority
voters.209
Indeed, this dispute is particularly ripe for culture cognition bias
because of the “fact-y” nature of the doctrinal test to be applied. The
key case is Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the Supreme
Court’s decision upholding Indiana’s voter ID law in 2008.210 After
Crawford, “a court evaluating a constitutional challenge to an election
regulation [must] weigh the asserted injury to the right to vote against
the ‘precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule.’”211 As Michael Gilbert explains, the
marching orders post-Crawford create an evidentiary showdown on
questions of “hard facts.”212 Courts must determine: (1) whether ID
laws actually combat fraud and (2) whether they actually depress
turnout by lawful voters.
So what do we know about these two factual questions that seem
to drive all constitutional challenges to voter ID laws? As to the first,
the only type of fraud a voter ID law is capable of preventing is “in-
person voter fraud”—attempts by one person to vote for another
person. And empiricists seem to agree that this kind of fraud is not
much of a problem: “Scholarly consensus is quite clear that there is
virtually no evidence of the type of in-person impersonation fraud
that voter ID laws seek to remedy.”213
To be fair, the other side of this dispute can be guilty of empirical
exaggeration as well. In terms of voter suppression effect of ID laws,
208 Id. at 419.
209 Peretti, supra note 195, at 225 Kyle C. Kopko, Litigant Partisan Identity and
Challenges to Campaign Finance Policies: An Examination of U.S. District Court Decisions,
1971–2007, 36 JUST. SYS. J. 212, 228–29 (2015) (pointing to “out-group bias” as a possible
influence on individual behavior); see generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS:
FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012) (noting that judges have
ruled along party lines in resolving partisan fights over election rules).
210 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008).
211 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
212 Gilbert, supra note 195, at 750–51 (showing that the Court considered whether the
opposing sides could support their positions with hard facts).
213 Peretti, supra note 195, at 218; see also LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF
VOTER FRAUD 6 (2010) (“[A]lmost no one knowingly and willfully casts an illegal vote in
the United States today. . . . Voter fraud is a politically constructed myth.”).
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“most studies have found, at best, a small impact on voter turnout.”214
Peretti sums up the empirical debate humorously: “[This is] a fight
between two bald men over a comb.”215
It is important to recognize, though, that not all factual authori-
ties are created equal. Some come from political scientists and are
based on sworn declarations or empirical studies published in peer-
review journals.216 But other purported expert opinions on these piv-
otal questions are chockful of anecdotal stories that “are often mis-
leading, incomplete, and unrepresentative.”217
Take, for example, two stories commonly circulated in camps who
support strict voter ID laws. The first surrounds the Wisconsin 2004
election. Susan Molinari, a Republican former congresswoman and
member of a commission founded to suggest reforms to the electoral
process, supported a call for voter ID laws by pointing out that in the
Wisconsin 2004 election there were “more than 200 cases of felons
voting illegally and more than 100 people who voted twice, used fake
names or false addresses, or voted in the name of a dead person.”218
The problem, however, as Spencer Overton details in his article,
is that these Wisconsin anecdotes are more myth than reality.219 For
one thing, none of the “double voting” individuals named by Molinari
and her fellow commissioners were indicted for fraud; the
Republican-appointed U.S. Attorney in Wisconsin instead found that
the cases involved either clerical errors or individuals with similar
names, but different birth dates.220 In fact, the Republican U.S.
Attorney explicitly stated: “We don’t see a massive conspiracy to alter
214 Peretti, supra note 195, at 218; see also Gilbert, supra note 195, at 749–50 (describing
the empirical literature on this question as mixed); Michael J. Pitts & Matthew D.
Newmann, Documenting Disfranchisement: Voter Identification During Indiana’s 2008
General Election, 25 J.L. & POL. 329, 330 (2009) (finding that out of the 2.8 million persons
who cast ballots in the 2008 Indiana election, 1039 arrived without photo ID and cast a
provisional ballot, and 902 did not get their votes counted).
215 Peretti, supra note 195, at 218 (quoting Ethan Bronner).
216 Indeed many leading election law scholars welcome the empirical evidence, calling
for a “‘data-driven’ focus” to this constitutional dispute. Pitts & Newmann, supra note 214,
at 329; see also HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX 5–6 (2009) (calling for a
“Democracy Index” that would use comparative data on state and local election
performance to gauge the need for reform).
217 Overton, supra note 194, at 644; see MINNITE, supra note 213, at 56–73 (showing
instances of alleged voter fraud did not actually involve fraud); Justin Levitt, Election
Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted Electoral Regulation, 11 ELECTION L.J. 97, 108–09
(2012) (same); see also Gilbert, supra note 195, at 746 n.37 (“Some suggest that voter fraud
is rarer than UFO sightings.”).
218 Overton, supra note 194, at 646 (quoting COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM,
BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS 4 (2005)).
219 See id. at 645–48 (discussing how the “Wisconsin anecdotes are misleading”).
220 Id. at 646.
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the election in Milwaukee, one way or another.”221 Moreover, even
“[a]ssuming that each of these instances resulted from intentional
voter fraud rather than a clerical mistake . . ., this is a fraud rate of less
than one-seventh of one percent”—hardly a terrifying rate used to jus-
tify reform.222
In addition to exaggerating the numbers, other voter fraud anec-
dotes “often distract with emotion and fail to reveal the causes or
effects of fraud.”223 For example, the first page of John Fund’s book
Stealing Elections: How Voter Fraud Threatens Our Democracy opens
with a startling line: “At least eight of the nineteen hijackers who
attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were actually able
to register to vote in either Virginia or Florida while they made their
deadly preparations for 9/11.”224 This “fact” has considerable sticking
power and is used by photo-identification proponents to cite the
danger of voter fraud nationwide.225
But this story has some holes in it, to say the least. Researchers
and journalists have been unable to confirm that any of the 9/11
hijackers were actually registered to vote, and—more importantly—
even if they were registered to vote there is zero evidence that any
“improper registration resulted in fraudulent votes” or could be
resolved by a photo ID requirement.226
These misleading anecdotal stories are not just circulated on
Facebook; they can worm their way into judicial opinions as well. The
Wisconsin election story, for example, was cited by a U.S. district
court in Connecticut as evidence to conclude that the voter ID law
there should be upheld.227 Importantly, the court’s citation of the
story was not haphazard. It was told as part of a long, careful narrative
of various states’ experience with voter ID laws and it led to the con-
clusion that “although elections in the United States are far from riven
221 Id. at 647 (quoting former United States Attorney Steve Biskupic).
222 Id.
223 Id. at 648. Atiba Ellis goes so far as to call voting fraud fears a “meme;” she suggests
anecdotes that propel fears of voting fraud get traction precisely because they are “prone
to abundant social sharing because it plays into shared emotions and experience.” Atiba R.
Ellis, The Meme of Voter Fraud, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 879, 887 (2014) (quoting Simon
Owens, How Internet Memes Went Corporate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/04/25/how-internet-memes-went-corporate); see
also id. at 880 (calling fears of voter fraud a “modern-day bogeyman”).
224 Overton, supra note 194, at 648 (quoting JOHN FUND, STEALING ELECTIONS: HOW
VOTER FRAUD THREATENS OUR DEMOCRACY 1 (2004)).
225 Id. at 649 (citing editorials relaying the story).
226 Id.
227 ACORN v. Bysiewicz, 413 F. Supp. 2d 119, 137 (D. Conn. 2005).
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by fraud, the potential for voter fraud exists, and states are, therefore,
right to be concerned about it and to take steps to minimize it.”228
This is an important point and it underscores one specific feature
of alternative facts that causes me to worry. The Connecticut judge
did not cite the anecdotal evidence flippantly. It does not seem to
have been a sloppy mistake. Instead, it was part of a long and detailed
opinion. Surrounded by a sea of evidence, and when push comes to
shove, the judge—like the rest of us—was drawn to the familiar.
This is bad for constitutional law, and not just because false facts
are contaminating judicial opinions. With the two sides speaking past
each other and refusing to grant empirical weaknesses in their respec-
tive claims, the constitutional debate reaches an unhealthy stalemate.
Michael Gilbert explains it well. He argues that the “sophisticated
narrative” of the voter ID dispute (as opposed to the “common narra-
tive”) is that it is likely that these laws both “deter some fraud, how-
ever little, and they simultaneously depress some lawful votes,
however few.”229 The tough normative question, therefore, becomes
evaluating the trade-off.230 But that nuance is lost in the current
debate. Because we are living in an age where the dueling factual nar-
ratives do not interact with each other and the “my team-your team”
facts serve to entrench thinkers into their extreme respective camps,
there is reason to be concerned that the facts on the ground will just
cease to matter at all.
C. Licensing Regulations
Not all examples of bad facts in constitutional law come at the
expense of traditionally conservative causes. Claims of economic lib-
erty championed by libertarians and groups like the Center for
Individual Rights expose other examples.
Many states subject small businesses to onerous licensing laws
under the guise of flimsy factual records supposedly justifying such
restrictions for public health.231 From hair braiding to teeth whitening
to floral design, small businesses are often subject to regulations
requiring them to take extensive classes or to obtain licenses and
expensive certification.232
228 Id. at 137–38.
229 Gilbert, supra note 195, at 752.
230 See id. at 753 (“On the normative side, there is a lack of consensus on the social costs
of depressed turnout and the benefits of fraud prevention.”).
231 See generally John Blevins, License to Uber: Using Administrative Law to Fix
Occupational Licensing, 64 UCLA L. REV. 844 (2017) (describing various state license
laws).
232 Id. at 857.
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These licensing laws have drawn sharp criticisms from conserva-
tive groups who claim that they are nothing more than anticompeti-
tive barriers to entry dressed up in fake facts about public safety.233
Critics say the “science” purporting to justify these laws—claims that
teeth whitening and hair braiding can be dangerous, for example—are
just lies used to shut down competitors.234 Unlike the above examples,
the applicable constitutional test here is just rationality review,235 but
even on such a deferential standard at least one factual record has still
failed to make the grade.
African hair braiding is a “traditional practice [that] involves an
intricate process of weaving, twisting, and braiding that is considered
more natural because it uses no chemicals.”236 In states like
Washington, Missouri, and Arkansas, however, in order to sell ser-
vices in African hair braiding, an individual must obtain a cosme-
tology license—which includes payment of a fee and up to 330 hours
of supervised training.237
These license laws are justified by concerns about scalp safety,
but there are serious doubts as to whether the factual claims about the
risks are based on anything except creative lobbying by competitor
salons. Indeed, in 2016 the Institute of Justice (a conservative think
tank) commissioned a nationwide study that demonstrated the risk of
complaint of injuries from hair braiding was astonishingly low—only
233 See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 209, 216–18 (2016) (arguing that many occupations are not related to
protection of the public health and safety); Marc P. Florman, Comment, The Harmless
Pursuit of Happiness: Why “Rational Basis with Bite” Review Makes Sense for Challenges
to Occupational Licenses, 58 LOY. L. REV. 721, 741–42 (2012) (arguing that restrictive
licensing laws could restrict would-be entrepreneurs from starting businesses); Austin
Raynor, Note, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99 VA. L. REV.
1065, 1068 (2013) (arguing that the “major purpose is to suppress competition by
restricting entry into a particular profession”).
234 See, e.g., Braiding, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/issues/economic-liberty/braiding/
(last visited Dec. 3, 2017) (“Braiding is a very safe practice as braiders do not use any
dangerous chemicals, dyes or coloring agents and do not cut hair. . . . The Institute for
Justice is dedicated to untangling these entrepreneurs from burdensome regulations.”); see
also Daren Bakst & Patrick Tyrrell, Big Government Policies that Hurt the Poor and How
to Address Them, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 5, 2017), http://www.heritage.org/poverty-and-
inequality/report/big-government-policies-hurt-the-poor-and-how-address-them
(“Licensing requirements can also be cronyism disguised as consumer protection.”).
235 See, e.g., Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1105 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (“A state
can require high standards of qualification when regulating a profession but any
qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to
engage in the chosen profession.”).
236 Blevins, supra note 231, at 864–65.
237 Id. at 865; see also Cornwell, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1101, 1110 n.27 (showing an example
where hair braiding certification required 228 hours).
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0.34 of one percent.238 The report concluded that “[c]omplaints
against braiders are so rare that a person is 2.5 times more likely to get
audited by the IRS (8.6 in 1000) than a licensed or registered braider
is to receive a complaint of any kind (3.4 in 1000).”239
In a series of lawsuits, plaintiffs have claimed that these licensing
laws violate their substantive Due Process and Equal Protection
Clause rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.240 Such lawsuits
have been met with mixed success.
In a 1999 case, Cornwell v. Hamilton, a district judge in California
went through the cosmetology license requirements one by one and
found them to be largely irrelevant to hair braiding.241 After going
through multiple expert depositions and declarations about the threat
to public safety, the judge noted that “opinion testimony without suffi-
cient factual foundation are of little assistance.”242 Even on rationality
review, the court held this law could not stand because there was no
logical connection between requiring a license of the hair braiders and
protecting public health (particularly given the lack of chemicals used
by the braiders).243
Not all such lawsuits have met the same fate, however. In 2016,
the same sort of law was challenged in Missouri and that court, in
Niang v. Carroll, held it was inappropriate to even ask about whether
the health and safety restrictions on hair braiding were based in
fact.244 Dismissing the plaintiffs’ reliance on Cornwell, the Niang
Court explained the connections between hair braiding and public
safety were not to be probed.245
Alternative facts about scalp safety are accepted as true in the
name of deference despite any reliable evidence to support them, and
238 ANGELA C. ERICKSON, INST. FOR JUSTICE, BARRIERS TO BRAIDING: HOW JOB-
KILLING LICENSING LAWS TANGLE NATURAL HAIR CARE IN NEEDLESS RED TAPE 2, 13
(July 2016), http://ij.org/report/barriers-to-braiding/.
239 Id. at 2.
240 Cornwell, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1102.
241 See id. at 1118 (“[T]he State’s mandated curriculum, on its face and upon review of
its actual implementation and associated texts and exam, does not teach braiding while at
the same time it requires hair braiders to learn too many irrelevant, and even potentially
harmful, tasks.”).
242 Id. at 1108.
243 See id. at 1113–14 (finding mandatory exposure to “hazardous chemicals [hair
braiders] do not use and otherwise would be able to avoid” as “irrational”).
244 See Niang v. Carroll, No. 4:14 CV 1100 JMB, 2016 WL 5076170, at *18 (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 20, 2016) (“[Such] stringent review of a state’s asserted interests and how each aspect
of the State’s licensing regime promotes those interests is not consistent with Supreme
Court case law which holds that those connections are ‘not subject to courtroom fact-
finding.’” (quoting FCC v. Beach Comm’n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993))).
245 See id. at *15 (“[I]t is not this Court’s job to adjudicate the weighing of evidence. It is
enough that the State has a ‘conceivable’ basis for regulating . . . .”).
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small business-owners are left to fight cumbersome and costly regula-
tions without any real justification. To be sure, this could be attributed
to a deficiency in the applicable standard of review. But the point for
now is just to demonstrate another example of alternative facts at
work in laws that affect constitutional rights.
III
EQUIPPING COURTS TO GUARD AGAINST
ALTERNATIVE FACTS
With all of this doom and gloom, it seems unlikely this Article
will end happily. And yet there is cause for modest optimism. Evi-
dence suggests that legal training endows judges with “a specialized
form of cognitive perception”246—a defense that dilutes the effect
alternative facts have on the rest of us. Moreover, down in the
trenches, several lower court judges (appointed by both Republican
and Democratic Presidents) have shown this resistance in action—
fact-checking dubious “experts” and expressing skepticism when
skepticism is due.247
Traditionally federal courts have been “reluctant fact-finders,”248
and particularly appellate courts are prone to wash their hands of the
controversy and to ignore sketchy authorities in the legislative record
all in the name of deference.249 I argue that the time has come for that
to change. Indeed, this factual skepticism needs to now be a central
feature of judicial review in constitutional cases, at least when a court
is applying a heightened standard of review. Borrowing from adminis-
trative law principles and highlighting cases where factual inaccuracies
have actually been exposed by courts doing laborious fact-checking
work, I argue below that courts are indeed capable of rising above the
fray created by a factual free-for-all society.
246 Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation
of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 354–55 (2016)
(noting that such legal training “fix[es] judges’ attention on such decision-relevant features
of a case notwithstanding the tug of influences that might systematically focus the attention
of the public on facts that are irrelevant—and indeed inimical—to impartial legal
decisionmaking”).
247 See infra Section III.C and Part IV.
248 Borgmann, supra note 26, at 6 (noting that federal courts “have certainly disavowed
preeminence in fact-finding, preferring to articulate their role, instead, as to decide the
law”).
249 See id. at 6–7 (noting that “[f]ederal courts have long held that [both congressional
and state legislative] findings of empirical fact are entitled to judicial deference”); see also
Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 295 (5th Cir.) (“Courts are not permitted
to second guess a legislature’s stated purposes absent clear and compelling evidence to the
contrary. Such evidence simply does not appear in the record here.” (internal citations
omitted)), vacated in part, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (mem.).
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A. A Fresh Look at Institutional Competence
Evaluating judicial reception of facts in constitutional law begs
the question: Compared to what? Debates about fact-finding always
return to the question of which institution—a court or a legislature—
is better equipped to make the factual determination in these hot-
button debates.250 Moreover, even for discussions about the judiciary,
there is no consensus on which level of court—trial or appellate—has
the greater capacity to deal with legislative facts. Both debates need to
be revisited in light of the changes to fact-finding highlighted above.
1. Legislatures v. Courts251
The traditional argument stresses numerous advantages legisla-
tures have over courts in how they process information: Specifically,
the advantages of “substantial staff, funds, time and procedures to
devote to effective information gathering and sorting.”252 Legisla-
tures, after all, have the power to subpoena witnesses; they can con-
duct hearings that span a long period of time; they are not constrained
by the pace of litigation or the norm of party control; and they are
often supported by impressive institutions like the Congressional
Research Service.253 On top of all this, legislatures have the advantage
of being politically accountable, thus lending a legitimacy to their find-
ings of fact that courts may lack.254 And—not being bound by stare
decisis—legislatures can react to changed factual circumstances
nimbly in a way courts cannot.255
Of course that is not the full story. As scholars like Neal Devins
and Caitlin Borgmann have pointed out, there are “good reason[s] to
250 See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact Finding in Rights-
Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 882 (2013) (arguing
“that justifications for deference based on . . . Congress’s institutional expertise or political
legitimacy do not, without more, provide a sufficiently nuanced answer”); Borgmann,
supra note 26, at 35 (arguing that courts “must be unconstrained in their ability to ascertain
the factual basis for legislation”); Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1169, 1175 (2007) (arguing that broad policy questions “are particularly ill-suited to
the judicial process” and better left to the legislature).
251 I am limiting my discussion to federal courts. Certainly state courts may possess
some of these same characteristics but because federal judges are not elected and hold life-
time tenure, they are distinctly situated and I limit my discussion on judicial competence to
them.
252 Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 578 (1994) (noting the legislature’s “unique expertise” in fact-
finding); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative
Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5–6
(1986) (similarly noting the difference in institutional competencies).
253 See Devins, supra note 24, at 1178–81 (making these observations).
254 Araiza, supra note 250, at 888.
255 Devins, supra note 24, at 1180.
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doubt whether Congress [and state legislatures have] the incentives to
take factfinding seriously.”256 It should shock no one to learn that leg-
islative fact-finding forays can quickly turn into political theater. Com-
mittee staff prep expert witnesses to ensure they say what the
politicians want them to say; legislative fact-finding hearings are
sometimes held before empty rooms or are just opportunities for
political grandstanding rather than in-depth probing of one another’s
views; and partisan loyalties often take priority over the quest for the
truth.257 At the end of the day, “[u]ltimately, with fundraising, constit-
uent service, and other demands, members of Congress cannot pursue
knowledge for knowledge’s sake.”258
Still the debate rages on about which institution should get the
final say on the factual premise to laws that affect constitutional
rights. Some say that the judicial standards of review used to evaluate
legislative factual records in constitutional law cases have become too
stringent and threaten legislative supremacy.259 Others say that they
are not tough enough, particularly when constitutional rights are vul-
nerable.260 Still others say that there is no explanation for the legal
standards in various cases other than mere politics: Judges affirm if
they like the factual conclusions and reverse if they do not.261
256 Id. at 1182; Borgmann, supra note 26, at 7–9; see also Pilchen, supra note 42, at 339
(discussing “the Supreme Court’s proper function when reviewing enforcement
legislation” by examining judicial interpretations of post-Civil War amendments).
257 See Devins, supra note 24, at 1183–84 (noting such examples).
258 Id. at 1184. But see Laycock, supra note 250, at 1175 (“Most of the real discussions in
which legislators ‘find’ facts occur ex parte and off the record. The laws they enact are
legitimate because they are responsible to voters and because this is apparently the best we
can do, not because anything about legislative investigations inspires confidence.”).
259 See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The
Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 328, 369 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s constitutional review
of federal statutes is misguided because “Congress is not an agency, and the reasons for
‘on-the-record’ review in the administrative context do not apply to the legislative
branch”); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80,
115–16 (2001) (“The Court’s new heightened review of the legislative record has
transformed Congress’s role from a coequal branch warranting judicial deference to an
entity charged with extensive factfinding responsibilities.”).
260 See Borgmann, supra note 26, at 3 (“[C]ourts should independently review the
factual foundations of all legislation that curtails important individual rights protected by
the federal Constitution . . . .”); McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 39, at 103–09 (noting
that the benefits of the judiciary compared to the downsides of legislatures—the often
“impersonal and general data” used in legislation, the benefit of “diversity in experience
and background” of a jury, and the ability of “the Supreme Court to invalidate legislation
of a branch with greater geographic and socioeconomic diversity”—warrant tougher
judicial review).
261 See Araiza, supra note 250, at 881 (explaining the divergent approaches to deference
on legislative facts, and acknowledging that “[c]ynics can easily rationalize the divergent
results by referring to the [underlying] politics”); Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain:
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Scholars have called this debate “under-theorized”262 and yet
“critically important . . . now more than ever.”263 I join the voices of
skeptics who doubt the “widely accepted view that legislative bodies
are better than courts at fact-finding.”264 But specifically, I think the
conversation on this question needs to take account of the troubling
new trends in the political dialogue discussed above.
Not only do legislators lack the incentives to sort the good facts
from the bad ones, but now they are actually further incentivized to
tell the people what they want to believe. And technology gives them
powerful tools to bend to that temptation. If we are all predisposed to
believe factual claims consistent with our social networks, then a
smart legislator will feed into those networks (“my team-your team”
facts) and not rock the boat by voicing dissent. In other words, in
today’s culture, the “compared to what” question starts to paint courts
in a better light.
To this end, Dan Kahan and his colleagues have done important
work that may provide guidance on the capacity of courts to deal with
alternative facts. Recall that, in several studies, Kahan has found “cul-
tural polarization” on questions of fact—that is, “[p]eople endorse
whichever position reinforces their connection to others with whom
they share important commitments.”265 The reason for this, Kahan
submits, is “‘identity-protective’ cognition,” meaning “individuals
subconsciously resist factual information that threatens their defining
values.”266
Kahan and his colleagues also found, however, that there may be
ways to “broker peace” in the “culture war of facts.”267 It turns out
that how the facts are presented makes a world of difference. For
example, in one experiment Kahan showed two reports on climate
change to two groups of subjects.268 In both versions, the report
described that the planet was warming, that humans were the source
of the increase, and that the climate change could have disastrous
environmental effects.269 The only difference between the reports
Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 945 (1999)
(“Critiques of deference have remained relatively superficial, often dismissing deference as
a mere tool wielded by ideological judges to achieve a particular political result.”).
262 McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 39, at 69; see also Solove, supra note 261, at 945
(“[T]he concept of deference remains malleable, indeterminate, and not well-defined.”).
263 Bertrall L. Ross II, The State as Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial
Distrust of the Legislative Record, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2027, 2027 (2014).
264 Borgmann, supra note 26, at 2.
265 Kahan, supra note 86, at 296.
266 Braman et al., supra note 87, at 5.
267 Id. at 2.
268 Id. at 4.
269 Id. at 4–5.
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handed to the two groups was in the last line: one called for
“increased anti-pollution regulation” whereas the other called for
“revitalization of the nation’s nuclear power industry.”270
This last line mattered a great deal. Kahan found that people who
received the report ending in the nuclear power suggestion were “less
culturally polarized” in their assessment of the other facts about cli-
mate change (i.e., anti-pollution reasons).271 That is, people whom
Kahan had classified as “individualistic and hierarchs” were likely to
reject the climate change description if it was packaged in a narrative
that included a statement they found to be threatening—that is, the
increased pollution regulation—but less likely to reject the factual
conclusions if tempered with the conclusion about nuclear power. The
way the facts were communicated, in other words, made a difference
in how they were received.
What to make of this? And what does it have to do with the
debate about institutional competency to digest factual information?
For one thing, as Kahan’s research shows, factual narratives matter.
And nowhere is this truer than in constitutional litigation. As demon-
strated above, modern lawyers seeking constitutional change are hip
to this—they take the factual frame very seriously. One way to resist
the power of alternative facts, therefore, is to shift focus away from
the factual claim itself and instead to highlight the source from which
it comes.
Courts are well-suited for this job. Just like the subjects in
Kahan’s studies, judges, too, seem to be influenced by factual claims
that come from a surprising source. Take, for example, the amicus
briefs filed by the military groups and corporations in the 2003
University of Michigan Law School affirmative action case.272 Those
briefs—which were brought up in oral argument, cited in the ultimate
opinion, and mentioned when Justice O’Connor read her decision
aloud from the bench—were powerful precisely “because they [were]
written by entities that one would expect to be supporting the other
side of the case.”273 This is Kahan’s insight at work in constitutional
litigation. And—due to the nature of litigation—judges are uniquely
positioned to spot the “surprising source” of factual information.
270 Id. at 5.
271 Id.
272 See generally Larsen & Devins, supra note 122, at 1905 (discussing Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), as an example).
273 Dan Schweitzer, Fundamentals of Preparing a United States Supreme Court Amicus
Brief, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 523, 534 (2003); see also Larsen & Devins, supra note
122, at 1905.
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More importantly, courts also seem to already possess a resis-
tance to the infection that is plaguing the political discourse. In a study
that tested whether political predispositions influence judicial deci-
sionmaking, Dan Kahan and colleagues presented 253 sitting judges
and 800 members of the general public with legal problems designed
to trigger unconscious bias.274 What they found was quite remarkable:
“Judges of diverse cultural outlooks—ones polarized on their views of
the risks of marijuana legalization, climate change, and other con-
tested issues—converged on results in cases that strongly divided com-
parably diverse members of the public.”275 The same held true for
lawyers, although not for law students.276
This means there is perhaps an antidote to our toxic post-truth
political debates. Kahan concludes that “professional judgment,” and
“legal training” can “counter-act” the cognitive bias and motivated
reasoning that lead others to accept alternative facts.277 He suggests
that lawyers and judges can be “expected to reliably fix their attention
on pertinent elements of case ‘situation types,’ thereby immunizing
them from the distorting influence that identity-protective cognition
exerts on the judgments of legally untrained members of the
public.”278
In light of this insight and the growing rise of alternative facts, the
institutional competency debate deserves a reboot. Even if once legis-
latures had superior fact-finding tools, the skepticism about their
incentives to use those tools for truth-seeking has been vindicated in a
world of alternative facts. And courts—although certainly not per-
fect—may be uniquely equipped to focus on the sources of the facts
and to resist the motivated reasoning that leads to the proliferation of
alternative facts. It is worth exploring, therefore, ways to channel judi-
cial proclivity for objectiveness and the adversarial energy of constitu-
tional litigants in order to protect constitutional law against
alternative facts.
At the risk of dampening my optimistic note, a word of caution is
due. I must acknowledge that there is a fundamental difference
between what judges do and what scientists do. In short, science
rejects finality where courts seek it. And these cross-purposes might
well mean that the law will never catch up to the current state of sci-
entific knowledge. But the mere fact that there can be more than one
truth does not mean that claims can’t be false. Put differently, even if
274 Kahan et al., supra note 246, at 349–50.
275 Id. at 354.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 374.
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the state of science is unsettled on any particular question (which will
often be the case), political actors are incentivized to misrepresent the
existing science for political gain. And even accepting the limitation
inherent in the mismatch between science and law, courts have a
greater capacity to aspire to objectiveness—to catch the over-claims
and cherry-picking and falsifications—than do their democratically
accountable counterparts.279
2. Trial Courts v. Appellate Courts
It is not enough to conclude that courts are more capable than
legislatures at resisting alternative facts. We must also determine—
within the judiciary—whether trial judges or appellate judges are
better situated to make these factual calls. This question is a difficult
one when it comes to legislative facts. On the one hand, trial courts
are historically the better fact-finders generally, but on the other hand
legislative facts—by definition—affect more than the parties before
the court and involve issues that can transcend the jurisdiction where
the trial judge is operating.
Most people see legislative facts to be the business of appellate
courts.280 Because legislative facts are entangled with the poli-
cymaking function of judging, the argument goes, we should lay that
duty at the feet of appellate judges who have larger jurisdiction and
more experience generating broad rules. But this, too, is a conven-
tional wisdom worth a second thought. When considering which judi-
cial level is best situated to discern facts from alternative facts, the
landscape changes a bit. In fact, when one stops to really think about
it, the trial judge may well look better than an appellate judge at fact-
finding, even when it comes to evaluating legislative facts.
For one thing, the trial judge has her hands on the levers of the
adversarial system—at least more so than an appellate judge—and
she can better leverage the fact-checking potential of the parties. A
lower court, for example, has more control over the pace of the litiga-
tion, can easily request additional briefing or a hearing, and can some-
times observe the witnesses as they testify on cross-examination.281
Her appellate counterpart, by contrast, approaches the record cold
and is fact-checking with the aid of amicus briefs and other advocacy
279 See generally LEVITAN, supra note 193 (referring to politicians’ tendencies to
oversimplify and cherry-pick factual claims).
280 Kenji Yoshino, Appellate Deference in the Age of Facts, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
251, 254 (2016) (“The consensus among appellate courts is that legislative facts are
reviewed de novo.”).
281 See Devins, supra note 24, at 1178–81 (noting these examples).
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tools that skew the narrative one way or another.282 Trial courts are
used to getting their hands dirty with facts; appellate courts are not.
There is value to be gained by relying on the judicial actor who has
more experience making credibility calls—even when it comes to gen-
eralized facts as opposed to case-specific ones.283
Indeed, although it may be lying dormant, the procedural skel-
eton already exists for trial courts to use when addressing complex
issues of legislative facts. The federal rules specifically contemplate
the use of court-appointed experts and special masters to address
complex factual matters that extend beyond the capacity of the adver-
sarial system.284 Although courts rarely take advantage of this
power,285 a court-appointed expert could be extremely valuable when
considering dueling opinions on complex questions of legislative fact,
such as the effect of voter ID laws on minority turnout or the cancer
risks of abortion. Similarly, a special master—a court appointed
officer instructed to hear evidence and make recommendations to a
judge—is rarely used by federal courts, but could be exceedingly valu-
able to a trial judge strapped for time and constrained with limited
expertise in the relevant subject matter.286
282 See Gorod, supra note 15, at 4 (“[A]pellate courts often look outside the record the
parties develop before the trial court, turning instead to their own independent research
and to amicus briefs, even though the resulting factual findings will not have been
thoroughly tested by the adversarial process.”); see also Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus
Facts, supra note 16, at 1807 (noting this phenomenon in the greater context of the role of
amicus briefs before the Supreme Court).
283 See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1984) (“The trial judge’s
major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes
expertise.”). Indeed, it is a bit unusual that the procedural safeguards we think essential at
the trial stage for adjudicative facts are not routinely employed for legislative facts. See
Gorod, supra note 15, at 59 (“If anything, one might think the opposite would be true . . . .
Legislative facts will often be more complicated than adjudicative facts.”).
284 FED. R. EVID. 706 (referring to court appointed experts); FED. R. CIV. P. 53
(referring to special masters).
285 See Stephanie Domitrovich, Fulfilling Daubert’s Gatekeeping Mandate Through
Court-Appointed Experts, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 35, 42 (2016) (arguing for
judges’ increased exercise of their inherent authority to appoint experts through this
underutilized rule of evidence); Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial
Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 480, 480–81 (1988) (referring to courts’ reluctance to appoint experts); see also
THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SPECIAL MASTERS’ INCIDENCE AND
ACTIVITY: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES AND ITS SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPECIAL MASTERS 16 (2000) (noting that
“[c]onsideration of appointing a Rule 706 expert to testify was rare and appointment of
such an expert, even rarer”).
286 See Shira Scheindlin, We Need Help: The Increasing Use of Special Masters in Federal
Court, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 479, 479–80 (2009) (noting that following the 2003 amendment
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “courts expanded special masters’ roles to include
supervising pre-trial discovery disputes, conducting settlement negotiations in complex
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According to a leading survey of district court judges conducted
by the Federal Judicial Center, these tools are not commonly used
now because “[j]udges view the appointment of an expert as an
extraordinary activity that is appropriate only in rare instances in
which the traditional adversarial process has failed to permit an
informed assessment of the facts.”287 This well-entrenched intuition is
in need of an update. With legislative facts on the rise and “my team-
your team” facts infecting the adversarial system, these rarely-used
judicial tools could not only alleviate time and resource constraints
but could also attach legitimacy to the ultimate result by assuring the
losing side that all possible care was taken to marshal an objective
decisionmaker. And the best part, of course, is that district courts
already have these tools at their disposal.
Moreover, even without the special tools, there are other reasons
why a trial court is well-situated to guard against alternative facts.
Trial judges are more keenly attuned to the possibility of reversal than
are appellate judges. This reality derives simply from the nature of the
Supreme Court’s discretionary docket, as opposed to appeals of right
in lower courts.288 The possibility of reversal could make a difference.
As between the two actors, the feedback mechanism of reversal may
incentivize a district court judge to fact-check, more so than an appel-
late judge who faces reversals less often.
Finally, although this requires more speculation, appellate
judges—particularly those considered “on deck” for a potential
Supreme Court pick—run in elite circles and may be too close to
politics to be truly interested in the less glamorous fact-checking nec-
essary to sort the bunk from the real evidence. This may not be true of
trial court judges. Indeed, although admittedly not a comprehensive
study, the district court judges I found who are laudably in the weeds
debunking alternative facts were appointed by presidents of both
political parties.
cases, implementing and enforcing post-judgment orders and decrees, and administering
and distributing limited settlement funds”).
287 JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., COURT-APPOINTED
EXPERTS: DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 706, at 5 (1993).
288 See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 14–15 (1993) (noting that “aversion to
reversal [is] . . . fairly unimportant [to federal appellate] judges because [most] reversals . . .
reflect differences in judicial philosophy or legal policy rather than mistake or
incompetence by the appellate judges”); see also Jennifer Barnes Bowie & Donald R.
Songer, Assessing the Applicability of Strategic Theory to Explain Decision Making on the
Courts of Appeals, 62 POL. RES. Q. 393, 398 (2009) (arguing that the fear of reversal does
not significantly motivate federal circuit court judges in their decisionmaking).
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Granted, to accept my argument one must be comfortable with
more cases going beyond summary judgment and resulting in longer
litigation. This is a price I am willing to pay. There is a value to the
testing that comes with the adversarial system—it is much harder to
hide behind emotional anecdotes and unsubstantiated claims when
one knows he is subject to cross-examination. In the words of David
Boies upon completing his work on the same-sex marriage trial in
California:
In political debates, . . . it [is] too easy to “throw around opinions
[that] appeal to people’s fear and prejudice,” and “cite studies that
either don’t exist or don’t say what you say they do.” In a trial, . . .
“you’ve got to stand up under oath and cross-examination . . . .
When they come into court and they have to support those opinions
and they have to defend those opinions under oath and cross-
examination, those opinions just melt away. . . . [A] witness stand is
a lonely place to lie. And when you come into court, you can’t do
that.”289
If courts are capable of resisting the temptation to believe alternative
facts—particularly trial courts—the law must make sure we are har-
nessing that power by ensuring judges are probing the facts relevant to
constitutional law. The alternative is that judges will just incorporate
the bias experienced by everyone else, and the post-truth culture will
infect our most sacred rights.
B. Wading Through the Confused State of Deference with Respect
to Facts in Constitutional Cases
So what would it look like to take the resistance to cognitive bias
judges seem to possess and to channel it in a way that combats the
infection of false facts into constitutional law? To answer that question
one must first wade into the murky waters that govern deference to
factual questions in constitutional cases. And “murky” may be an
understatement. There are multiple levels of confusion in this area
concerning two deceptively straightforward questions: (1) How much
should a court defer to the empirical judgments underlying a piece of
legislation? And (2) how much should a reviewing court care about a
lower court’s evaluation of those same factual claims?
This area of the law is a mess on both levels. On the first ques-
tion, courts have been “vague and inconsistent.”290 Sometimes judges
289 YOSHINO, supra note 128, at 7–8 (quoting David Boies).
290 See David Parker, Note, Policing Procedure Before Substance: Reforming Judicial
Review of the Factual Predicates to Legislation, 99 VA. L. REV. 1327, 1327–28 (2013)
(laying out the confusion on this question and then arguing for more deference to
“properly motivated legislature[s]” that take “[their] fact-finding role seriously”).
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will evoke separation of powers and argue for deference, claiming that
legislatures are “‘better equipped than the judiciary to “amass and
evaluate the vast amounts of data” bearing upon’ legislative ques-
tions.”291 Sometimes, however, judges will approach a legislative fac-
tual record with skepticism, treating government actors (in the words
of Bertrall Ross) “as witnesses in their own trial by testing the credi-
bility of the evidence they offer in support of their actions.”292
The difference cannot be fully explained by the applicable stan-
dard of review. The general rule is that the level of skepticism due for
factual contentions in a legislative record should follow the corre-
sponding level of deference in a constitutional case.293 On rationality
review, a court will give the government the benefit of doubt and gen-
erally trust its factual contentions; on a form of heightened scrutiny—
when a fundamental right or a suspect class is involved—a court is
authorized to be more suspicious of a legislature’s factual record.294
Put differently, only on heightened scrutiny will a court open the
trunk and kick the tires of a law in order to make sure the state is
actually pursuing sufficiently weighty goals in a permissible way.
The problem, however, is that these rules allow for much wiggle
room (What is a factual conclusion versus a legal one? How much
factual uncertainty is too much?) and hence they are not followed
with any precision. Sometimes—as in Gonzales v. Carhart, the partial-
birth abortion decision—the Supreme Court chooses deference even
in light of medical uncertainty and even on heightened review.295
Other times—as in Shelby County v. Holder, the case striking down a
critical part of the Voting Rights Act—the Court evaluates findings of
fact with a healthy dose of skepticism and (while purporting to apply
rationality review) “essentially dispose[s] of the remainder of the
15,000 page congressional record supporting the Act in one
sentence.”296
Indeed, even the same justice can wear different deference hats
when tasked with answering this question in different circumstances.
291 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (quoting Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 662, 665 (1994) (plurality opinion)).
292 Ross, supra note 263, at 2031 (using Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013),
and United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), as his chief examples).
293 See id. at 2031 (“In the past, the relevant constitutional tests provided the framework
for scrutinizing the permissibility of state actions.”); see generally Araiza, supra note 250.
294 See Araiza, supra note 250, at 921–22 (noting that “heightened scrutiny requires that
the reviewing court have in front of it the actual facts of the situation,” whereas rationality
review “allows deference to even temporally inconsistent findings”).
295 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161–65 (2007) (deferring despite “documented
medical disagreement whether the Act’s prohibition would ever impose significant health
risks on women”).
296 Ross, supra note 263, at 2061–62 (discussing Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612).
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In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the violent video games
case from California, Justice Breyer’s position—even on strict scru-
tiny—was that “[t]his Court has always thought it owed an elected
legislature some degree of deference in respect to legislative facts of
this kind, particularly when they involve technical matters that are
beyond our competence.”297 But, in Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, abortion decision described above,298 Justice Breyer sang
a different tune. The judiciary, he explained, “retains an independent
constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional
rights are at stake;” this evidence-based balancing, Breyer explained,
includes a careful evaluation of all factual claims submitted by the
state, found by the district court, and claimed by amici.299
Similarly, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito dismissed a
claim made in an amicus brief about the costs of health care for
employees on the basis of a supposed judicial resistance to looking
outside the record for arguments that are “intensely empirical”
(which, as all lawyers recognize, sounds a bit like “there is too much
math in here”).300 But in the video games case discussed above,
Justice Alito was not shy with the empirical; he anchored his opinion
with dozens of secondary authorities about the neurological harm
caused by these games, provoking Justice Scalia to actually chide him
for his “considerable independent research” on questions of fact
beyond what the legislature considered.301
The confusion does not stop there. As alluded to above, this
rickety question of deference is then layered with a second rickety
question of deference: How should a reviewing court deal with a
lower court’s evaluation of fact? When, for example, a district court
finds that voter ID laws suppress minority votes, is that subject to
clear error review or de novo review or something else?
The conventional wisdom—although never clearly stated by the
Supreme Court—is that adjudicative facts are reviewed for clear error
but legislative facts get de novo review.302 But as Kenji Yoshino and
297 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 855 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
298 See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
299 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165).
300 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2776 (2014).
301 Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. at 798 (referencing the empirical citations in Justice
Alito’s concurrence, id. at 818–19 nn.13–18).
302 See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights
Cases, 101 CALIF. L. REV 1185, 1199 (2013) (noting that “[i]t is generally understood that
federal appellate courts must conduct an independent or de novo review of any issues of
law, while” reviewing “a trial court’s findings of fact” for clear error); Yoshino, supra note
280, at 254 (stating “that appellate courts generally grant clear error deference only to
adjudicative facts” whereas “legislative facts are reviewed de novo”).
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Caitlin Borgmann have thoroughly explained, the actual practice in
applying this rule is in “disarray.”303 Across the ideological spectrum
the justices are flatly inconsistent about what level of deference is due
to a lower court’s finding of legislative fact.
In Glossip v. Gross, for example, both Justice Alito’s majority
opinion and Justice Sotomayor’s dissent used clear error review to
evaluate whether the three-drug lethal injection protocol caused sig-
nificant pain to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.304 This
occurred even though the central factual question in Glossip was
about whether the drugs “generally rendered ‘any individual’ uncon-
scious”—a legislative fact about the world—as opposed to the effect
on the plaintiffs in that particular case.305
The confusion persists. Just a few years earlier, in the same-sex
marriage cases that reached the Court, Justice Alito took a different
tack. He argued that “it would be absurd for an appellate court to
accord clear error deference to a district court’s findings of legislative
facts.”306 Justice Alito did not mince words on this subject:
[S]ome professors of constitutional law have argued that we are
bound to accept the trial judge’s findings—including those on major
philosophical questions and predictions about the future—unless
they are ‘clearly erroneous.’ . . . Only an arrogant legal culture that
has lost all appreciation of its own limitations could take such a sug-
gestion seriously.307
Constitutional law scholars have indeed offered their own contri-
butions to this debate. On the first point (about judicial review of facts
found by a legislature), Bertrall Ross suggests courts look for failures
in the political process and only defer to factual conclusions when it
seems the process functioned adequately.308 Caitlin Borgmann sug-
gests no deference is appropriate whenever fundamental rights are at
303 See Yoshino, supra note 280, at 254 (noting inconsistent practice by the Supreme
Court on the subject).
304 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2739 (2015); id. at 2786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
305 Yoshino, supra note 280, at 259–60 (quoting Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2741); see also
DAVID L. FAIGMAN, THE SUPREME COURT’S CONFUSED EMPIRICAL JURISPRUDENCE
(2015) (discussing Glossip and whether the facts in question were legislative or
adjudicative facts).
306 Yoshino, supra note 280, at 261–63 (discussing Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652 (2013), and United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)).
307 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2719 n.7 (Alito, J., dissenting).
308 See Ross, supra note 263, at 2035 (arguing that in “instances of process malfunction,
it may be appropriate for courts to discount the record and engage in their own fact-
finding”).
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stake.309 By contrast, Ruth Colker and James Brudney suggest that
the current patterns of judicial scrutiny of legislative fact-finding
amounts to a large transfer of power from democratically accountable
institutions to non-accountable ones.310 And Daniel Crane argues that
legislative facts are highly normative and thus “squarely within the
legislative power.”311
As to deference from one level of court to the next, both de novo
review and clear error review have their champions and their critics.
Some say deference to trial courts is too expensive—it would
encourage more trials,312 and “[u]pend the [h]ierarchical [s]tructure of
the [c]ourts.”313 Others (including myself)314 have warned that giving
the appellate courts the power to evaluate these facts (what would
result from de novo review) encourages faulty fact-finding through
amicus briefs and unrestricted internet research, thereby bypassing
important checks from the adversarial process.315
C. What Should Be Done? Two Concrete Suggestions to Improve
the Standards of Review
These questions are not easy and there is more work to be done
in sorting out the answers. What follows, however, are two concrete
suggestions to retool the standards of review for questions of fact in
constitutional cases. They are intended to reflect the new modern
309 See Borgmann, supra note 26, at 38 (“[I]nstitutional respect for the legislative
process weighs less heavily against the substantial concerns of important individual
rights.”).
310 See Colker & Brudney, supra note 259, at 119–20 (arguing that the “approach is
further flawed in that it overlooks the important democracy-based aspects of information
gathering”).
311 Daniel A. Crane, Enacted Legislative Findings and the Deference Problem, 102 GEO.
L.J. 637, 637 (2014) (limiting his arguments to congressionally-found facts that have gone
through bicameralism and presentment).
312 See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986) (arguing that trials are
not the best way to establish legislative facts).
313 Yoshino, supra note 280, at 276; see also Borgmann, supra note 26, at 35 (arguing for
courts to engage in independent fact-finding “when a law threatens essential individual
rights and liberties”).
314 See generally Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, supra note 16
(arguing that in light of the digital revolution, “we need to seriously contemplate the
implications of in-house judicial fact finding”).
315 Kenji Yoshino has endorsed an intermediate standard of review (building on a brief
filed in the same-sex marriage litigation by Erwin Chemerinsky and Arthur Miller). This
standard of review—the suggestion that drew the ire from Justice Alito in United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)—would give “significant weight” to a lower court’s
findings but only if they are made through the adversarial system. I throw my hat in the
Yoshino-Chemerinsky camp but with a twist (described infra Section III.C.2). See Yoshino,
supra note 277, at 279–82.
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realities of fact-finding, and they are offered as an attempt to harness
the power of trial court judges—the actors I think are best equipped
to guard against the power of alternative facts.
1. Using Caution with the Label “Legislative Fact”
One partial fix to all of this confusion is to more carefully police
the line between adjudicative facts and legislative facts, or perhaps to
rethink the utility of the distinction altogether. Recall that the distinc-
tion was drawn eighty years ago by administrative law scholar,
Kenneth Culp Davis.316 In administrative law, of course, the differ-
ence between adjudication and legislation is very important and often
discussed. Generally speaking adjudication is backwards-looking and
relates to specific identifiable individuals while legislation is forward-
looking and relates to unnamed theoretical future individuals.317
This is the backdrop against which Davis coined the terms “legis-
lative fact” and “adjudicative fact.” Despite its name, “legislative fact”
does not mean facts found by a legislature. The label refers to the
nature of the fact: generalized observations about the world that often
involve predictions and are not limited to the named individuals
before the court. And this label carries significant consequences. Leg-
islative facts (but not adjudicative facts) are exempt from the federal
judicial notice rule, meaning a judge is permitted to look outside the
record to learn about the subject.318 And legislative facts (but not
adjudicative facts) are typically reviewed de novo by appellate
courts.319
As described above, U.S. constitutional law has grown to rely tre-
mendously on legislative facts over the past several decades—likely
well beyond what Davis could have imagined when he was writing
long ago. It is possible that the Davis distinction can’t bear the weight
of the growth spurt. Consider two examples. When a court is faced
with a law based on the premise that abortion may cause breast
cancer, most would label that factual premise a “legislative fact.” By
contrast, a claim that a particular vaccine causes an increased risk of
autism is labeled an “adjudicative fact.” And yet what is the real dif-
ference? Both facts involve questions of science and empirical evi-
316 Davis, supra note 45, at 402–03.
317 See JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES 21 (1927) (“What distinguishes legislation from adjudication is that
the former affects the rights of individuals in the abstract and must be applied in a further
proceeding before the legal position of any particular individual will be definitely touched
by it; while adjudication operates concretely upon individuals in their individual
capacity.”).
318 See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text (discussing legislative facts).
319 Yoshino, supra note 280, at 254.
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dence; both facts are largely outcome-determinative to the legal
doctrine they influence; both facts affect not only the parties to the
litigation but also future parties not identified.
Given the vast legal consequences that follow from whether a fact
is dubbed a legislative fact or an adjudicative fact, perhaps courts
should be more careful deciding what goes in which bucket. Indeed, it
may be time to rethink the contours of the boundaries between the
two concepts altogether. Why does the distinction exist? Davis articu-
lated this line principally out of concerns of notice and prejudice to
the parties.320 It is unfair to the parties for a court to take “judicial
notice” of a fact that may determine the outcome of their dispute but
without party participation in evaluating it. And, by contrast, it is
unfair to allow specific individuals to take control over a fact that will
affect many others not before the court.
But of course some factual questions typically labeled as adjudi-
cative (Does the lethal injection protocol cause serious pain in capital
punishment? Do vaccines increase a risk of autism?) have effects way
beyond the parties before the court. And some factual questions typi-
cally labeled as legislative (Do video games increase violent behavior
in kids? Is a partial birth abortion ever medically necessary?) also
have serious implications for the parties before the court and can
indeed be outcome-determinative.
The answer may be that the distinction was written into the laws
of evidence long before courts became so involved in disputes that
were accompanied by generalized questions of fact.321 Indeed, our
modern “fact-y” society means that legislatures today often take tradi-
tionally moral or political arguments and cloak them in claims of
fact.322 Relatedly, because courts are hungry for legislative facts,
sophisticated litigants know to provide them freely and effectively.
320 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 941 (1980)
[hereinafter Davis, Facts in Lawmaking] (“When legislative facts importantly affect the
Supreme Court’s lawmaking, the Court should consider whether procedural fairness
requires parties to have a pre-decision opportunity to challenge the facts. The Court
usually fails to provide such an opportunity.”); Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 945, 958 (1955) [hereinafter Davis, Judicial Notice] (“Only rarely have
courts specifically articulated the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts for
purposes of judicial or official notice.”).
321 See Davis, Judicial Notice, supra note 320, at 958 (detailing how evidence scholars
distinguished facts about the parties and facts about questions of law early on but that
courts only did so rarely); Keeton, supra note 49, at 14 (“[R]elatively little explicit
discussion of this distinction has appeared in judicial opinions.”).
322 See Borgmann, supra note 26, at 9 (“If legislatures think that courts will defer to
their factual findings, they are likely to present what are really moral positions or legal
conclusions as factual findings.”).
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We are thus driving an old distinction through new and rougher
terrain. It is time for an update. I suggest that when deciding whether
a fact is adjudicative or legislative, a judge should not ask just about
whether it is generalized or specific, but instead should ask a practical
question: Is this the type of question that would benefit from adver-
sarial testing and expert testimony?323 If so, perhaps it is not a legisla-
tive fact at all, and is instead well suited for trial. This change will
bring us back to the roots of the rules of evidence and it would more
significantly moor the legislative-fact/adjudicative-fact distinction to
the rationale that generated it in the first place.
2. Even for True Legislative Facts, Deference Should Follow
Process
Even if courts are more careful with the “legislative fact” label,
there will still remain the question of what should be done with the
truly generalized factual questions about the way the world works—
questions that do seem separate and apart from the parties litigating
them. I certainly do not argue for blind deference to trial court find-
ings any more than I endorse such deference to a legislative record.
Instead, I believe deference should be earned by the process of fact
checking at both levels.
In today’s age of alternative facts, in other words, the time has
come for courts to take a granular approach to the facts presented by
the legislature and to the courts. Put simply, the standards of review
should closely probe the process through which the factual claims
were made. Instead of just focusing on whether the legislature’s pur-
pose was rational or important or compelling, the Court should look
at the factual record and attempt to assess the process that led to it.
Questions to be asked include: Is the factual assertion backed by
peer-reviewed studies? Is more than one study cited? If the fact is the
product of a legislative hearing, was it bipartisan or more likely polit-
ical theater? Would the experts cited hold up on cross-examination?
Do they have degrees in the relevant fields? If a minority view in the
field, do the authorities acknowledge and explain the inconsistency
and is the methodology used accepted by the industry? The more
complete the process behind the factual statement, the greater defer-
323 Ann Woolhandler was ahead of the curve on this topic. In 1988, she pushed back on
the traditional definition of legislative fact and suggested instead that the focus be on what
type of evidence is required in each case. See Woolhandler, supra note 46, at 114 (“The key
difference between adjudicative and legislative facts is not the characteristics of particular
versus general facts, but rather, evidence whose proof has a more established place and
more predictable effect within a framework of established legal rules as distinct from
evidence that is more manifestly designed to create the rules.”).
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ence should be due from a court. By contrast, if the scientific evidence
has been cherry-picked or over-simplified or even fabricated or baldly
asserted, then the factual record deserves very little deference at all.
Of course, focusing on the fact-finding process is not an exact sci-
ence and surely will not eliminate all personal bias. But at the very
least the goal of these questions would be to sniff out the easily rebut-
table facts identified in Part II. To be concrete and a little blunt about
it, West Virginia can require its doctors to warn women seeking abor-
tions that they have an elevated chance of breast cancer as long as the
elected representatives have done their homework and produced
authorities such that a fact-checker would feel satisfied a connection
was plausible.
This type of granular process-based probe may seem onerous but
it is not unprecedented. In many ways it is the same logic used in
administrative law.324 When courts are deciding whether an agency is
entitled to deference for a policy decision, they ask whether the
agency took a “hard look” at the problem and they evaluate whether
the agency used sufficient procedures to do so.325 Similarly, under
what has been called “Chevron Step Zero,” courts examine the proce-
dures the agency used before deciding whether to grant deference on
a question of law.326 The basic idea of both doctrines is that when
more process is used beforehand we can assume the decision will be
better and thus it is more worthy of deference from those reviewing
it.327 So, for example, an agency that carefully undergoes the time-
consuming process of notice and comment rulemaking will “earn”
324 As described above, the analogy to administrative law is an apt one when one is
talking about legislative facts given the origin of the phrase. See supra notes 316–20 and
accompanying text (discussing Davis).
325 See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (articulating and
endorsing the “hard look” doctrine).
326 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (“The fair measure of
deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with
circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency,
formality, and relative expertness . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
327 See Mary Holper, The New Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1263–73 (2011) (explaining how agencies earn Chevron deference
with process); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 873–89 (2001) (describing Chevron Step Zero). Incidentally, the same idea is used
even further down on the administrative law deference scale: So-called Skidmore
deference largely turns on the circumstances surrounding the decision and whether
deference is justified. And for those ad-law junkies paying close attention, “hard look”
review—used when a court reviews agency policy making under an “arbitrary and
capricious” standard follows the same theme.
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Chevron deference to its resulting decision, but an agency position
quickly penned in an amicus brief will not.328
Although these doctrines of judicial review in administrative law
have their share of critics, they have also drawn praise from those who
recognize the positive side effects.329 In addition to encouraging trans-
parency in decisionmaking, incentivizing additional procedures allows
“affected parties to detect improper motives by government actors or
expose agency capture by a well-organized interest group, and thus
assign blame to the appropriate agency actors.”330 When a court
focuses on procedure before awarding deference it is in effect policing
bad behavior that is hard to detect otherwise. That at least is one
rationale for withholding deference to agencies unless they have
earned it by using thorough procedures in their decision-making.
In short, what I propose is the same thing here: a Chevron Step
Zero or “hard look” inquiry for legislative facts. This standard of
review would work on two levels: (1) A legislature deserves more def-
erence when it “shows its work” and undergoes more process before
making a factual claim, and (2) a lower court deserves more deference
from an appellate court when it gets its hands dirty with the facts as
well. Just like when a court reviews an agency’s legal conclusion or
policy decision (under the Chevron or hard-look doctrines, respec-
tively), a judge will accord more deference to a decision she is
reviewing if it appears the decision was the product of sophisticated
procedure.
To be clear, I am not arguing for a complete change in the consti-
tutional standards of review, nor am I suggesting that the level of def-
erence (at either level) should be absolute. Instead, I want the current
standards of review to focus less on the purpose of the legislature (the
328 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27 (holding that Chevron deference can be earned
through notice-and-comment rulemaking but not customs classifications); see also
Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155–56 (2012) (holding that the
Department of Labor’s position in an amicus brief is not due deference because the lack of
process would create “unfair surprise” of regulated parties).
329 See Holper, supra note 327, at 1264–66 (noting that “[f]ormal procedures promote
‘fairness and deliberation,’” “maintain constitutional checks and balances,” and “allow[ ]
agencies to engage in a cost-benefit analysis” (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 230)); see also
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 327, at 882–88 (explaining how Chevron Step Zero ensures
Chevron deference is only used when earned by the agencies); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron
Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 227 (2006) (“Mead is evidently motivated by a concern that
Chevron deference would ensure an insufficient safeguard against agency decisions not
preceded by formal procedures.”).
330 Holper, supra note 327, at 1266; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake,
58 DUKE L.J. 549, 602–04 (2009) (observing that “[c]omplex questions typically benefit
from agency expertise, and contentious legislative issues typically benefit from continuing
political debate at the administrative level” and arguing for an interpretive theory that
captures these advantages).
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way they do now) and more on the process used to generate the fac-
tual record.331 It is a refocus rather than a revolution. This change, as I
see it, has several benefits to it.
First, judges are good at evaluating process; at the very least they
are more comfortable doing that than they are at impugning legisla-
tive purpose. This task is not that far afield from other questions that
are part of the judicial homework already: What is privileged
authority versus non-privileged? Who counts as a qualified expert and
who doesn’t? Sure, the line drawing can be difficult, but we ask judges
to draw hard lines all the time and weighing authorities is a function
within the judicial wheelhouse.
Moreover, the intensity of the fact-checking can correlate with
the standard of review. How much process is due will depend on
whether a court is engaged in rationality review or some form of
heightened scrutiny.332 Thus, although I must concede that a fact-
checking standard of review will burden the already over-worked judi-
ciary, it is at least a burden that need not be felt in every case.
Second, this twist to the standards of review will reset the game
rules for the litigants and encourage quality sleuthing for facts as
opposed to the quantity fact-battle we now witness. As discussed
above modern litigants are increasingly sophisticated at growing the
facts they need to make constitutional change. By reading signals, set-
ting frames, participating in an intense amicus boom, and fueling law
office history to the extreme, we are witnessing a bit of an arms race
among advocates when it comes to gathering factual experts. This can
be dangerous, as discussed above, but perhaps the adversarial energy
behind it can be channeled in a different and useful way.
Recall that Kahan teaches that narratives and packaging matter a
great deal in our cognitive perception of facts.333 By retooling the
standards of review to look closely at the process behind factual
claims, we can police those packages with greater scrutiny. The goal is
to leverage the power of the adversarial process and give it more heft
in the enterprise of policing facts.
331 Doctrinally, I imagine this fact-checking inquiry would most likely fall within the
question of the law’s “fit” is it rationally-related, or narrowly-tailored, etc. But I can also
imagine if the facts justifying a law are exposed as patently false, that could shed light on
an impermissible purpose.
332 I am aware of a current debate about rationality review and whether it is
constitutional. See, e.g., Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102
VA. L. REV. 1627, 1630 (2016) (claiming that rationality review is problematic
constitutionally because “[t]here is no textual basis in the Constitution to justify reviewing
legislation for its rationality”). Without wading into those waters today, I only note that my
proposed standard is flexible enough to accommodate either position.
333 See discussion supra Section III.A.
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There are also positive consequences within the judiciary that will
flow from this fact-specific retooling of the standards of review. Most
obviously, it will clarify the confused standards of review currently
used when an appellate court reviews a district court’s evaluation of
legislative facts. If the district court takes the time to carefully fact
check the record before it, then an appellate court should defer to this
hard work.
This additional layer of deference will also reward industrious
judges who take on the admittedly time-intensive burden of fact-
checking. The intelligent design case in Pennsylvania and the Prop 8
same-sex marriage case in California provide good examples.334 Those
two judges (Judge Jones in Pennsylvania and Judge Walker in
California, both appointed by Republican Presidents) held lengthy
trials, listened to dozens of witnesses, culled through pages of testi-
mony and other evidence and ultimately wrote extremely lengthy
opinions with detailed fact-finding.335
This work is not glamorous. It is the nitty-gritty of judging: com-
paring authorities, digging into proffered reasons, searching for incon-
sistencies, and (perhaps most importantly) defending one’s conclusion
step by step in a written opinion. It is work to be valued—even if
judges don’t get it right every time.
As it currently stands, however, this fact-checking work is too
often swept aside. Recall, for example, that Vincent Rue was exposed
as unreliable by three different district court judges—appointed by
Presidents of different stripes.336 These judges were able to spot Rue’s
lack of credentials and catch that his testimony on post-abortion syn-
drome ran counter to the vast amount of authorities on the subject.337
Through some very advanced fact-checking involving digging into
email correspondence, one judge was even able to detect Rue’s finger-
prints on subsequent experts who testified in abortion restriction cases
334 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
335 See generally Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921; Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707.
336 See discussion supra Section II.A. Judge Alsop (Minnesota) was appointed by Nixon,
Judge Yeakal (Texas) was appointed by George W. Bush, and Judge Thompson (Alabama)
was appointed by Carter.
337 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 680 n.3 (W.D. Tex. 2014)
(noting that Rue’s involvement with the State’s expert witnesses negatively impacted their
credibility); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1333–34 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (concluding that “[b]ecause Dr. Rue lacks the academic qualifications and scientific
credentials possessed by plaintiffs’ witnesses” his testimony was not credible); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 768 (D. Minn. 1986) (“Dr. Vincent Rue possesses neither the
academic qualifications nor the professional experience of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.
More importantly, his testimony lacked the analytical force of contrary testimony offered
by plaintiffs’ witnesses.”), rev’d on other grounds, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988).
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in their own names but relied on Rue’s coaching. He expressed
“dismay[ ] by the considerable efforts the State took to obscure Rue’s
level of involvement with the experts’ contributions.”338
Nevertheless, this work was undone by appellate courts who
claim it is not a judge’s job to “second guess legislative factfinding,
‘improve’ on, or ‘cleanse’ the legislative process by allowing relitiga-
tion of the facts that led to the passage of a law.”339 As the Fifth
Circuit said in Abbott, there is no such thing as “empirical basis
review.”340 Indeed, that appellate court even cited with favor the same
experts that the district court had found were being coached by the
discredited Vincent Rue.341 The reversals are done all in the name of
deference to the legislature and through arguments about the proper
burden of proof.342
A similar dynamic occurred in South Dakota. A law there
requires that women seeking abortion be warned that abortion carries
an increased risk of suicide.343 The district court, in a challenge to that
law, noted that any connection between abortion and suicide has been
rejected by both the American College of Obstetricians and
338 Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 680 n.3; see also Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33
F. Supp. 3d 1381, 1387 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (“The court was struck by the flimsiness of
Anderson’s basis for reliance on Rue and by his failure to obtain basic information about
the affiliations, credentials, or employment of the consultant whose report he submitted as
his own.”).
339 Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott II),
748 F.3d 583, 594 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285,
294 (5th Cir.) (“As explained in Abbott II, if the State establishes that a law is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest, we do not second guess the legislature regarding the
law’s wisdom or effectiveness.”), vacated in part by 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (mem.); Planned
Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 897–98 (8th Cir. 2012) (allowing for the
disclosure that the risk of suicide or suicidal ideation is higher among women who receive
abortions without proving any causal link).
340 See Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 596 (stating that the first step in analyzing an abortion
regulation “is rational basis review, not empirical basis review”).
341 Compare id. at 592–93 (referring to the testimonies of Drs. Peter Uhlenberg and
James Anderson without critique or acknowledgement of Vincent Rue’s coaching) with
Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 680 n.3 (“[A]lthough the experts [Dr. Anderson and Dr.
Uhlenberg, among others] each testified that they personally held the opinions presented
to the court, the level of input exerted by [Vincent] Rue undermines the appearance of
objectivity and reliability of the experts’ opinions. Further, the court is dismayed by the
considerable efforts the State took to obscure Rue’s level of involvement with the experts’
contributions.”).
342 See Lakey, 769 F.3d at 295 (“Courts are not permitted to second guess a legislature’s
stated purposes absent clear and compelling evidence to the contrary.”); Abbott II, 748
F.3d at 594 (“The court may not replace legislative predictions or calculations of
probabilities with its own, else it usurps the legislative power.”).
343 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (Supp. 2017).
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Gynecologists and the American Psychological Association, and was
not supported by any evidence provided by the state.344
None of that mattered to the Eighth Circuit. It held that “in order
to render the suicide advisory unconstitutionally misleading or irrele-
vant, Planned Parenthood would have to show that abortion has been
ruled out, to a degree of scientifically accepted certainty, as a statisti-
cally significant causal factor in post-abortion suicides.”345 The appel-
late court, in other words, washed its hands of the fact-checking and
articulated the rules so that the district court was not permitted to do
it either.
I think this is a mistake. If a district court has gone to the trouble
of comparing authorities, scrutinizing methodologies, and evaluating
resumes, then that process should be rewarded with some deference
from a reviewing court. Of course a district court can be wrong on the
facts (and for that reason I don’t argue for an absolute un-reviewable
sort of deference). But when a record has been carefully assembled
and intensely scrutinized by a trial judge, that record should be appre-
ciated and respected on review – even for legislative facts. Not only
will this promote truth-seeking in the courts, but it will also have the
laudable collateral benefit of bolstering the public’s faith in govern-
ment. When judges “show their work,”—particularly after a trial that
puts generalized factual claims to the test—this may help stem the
harm from echo chambers and factual exchanges on social media.
At bottom, my argument rests on the notion that courts can and
should fact-check in constitutional cases; and when they do (at
whatever level), that work should be valued on appeal. Unlike per-
haps methodological differences about interpreting the Constitution
(which are entrenched and hard to shake), we should expect courts to
be able to evaluate the legitimacy of the legislative facts submitted to
them. After all, the law has always relied on judges to evaluate evi-
dence and to separate the good from the bad. Perhaps the rise of
“alternative facts” just requires a tweak in what is required of courts
tasked with evaluating them. It is a job our democracy is crying out
for, and it is a job that courts are up to doing.
IV
ALTERNATIVE FACTS CAN BE EXPOSED: JUDICIAL
SUCCESS STORIES
Finally, I wish to end this Article with a series of judicial success
stories. I have found several examples where courts do put factual
344 Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 983 (D.S.D. 2009).
345 Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 900 (8th Cir. 2012).
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claims to the test and they have been able to debunk facts that deserve
debunking. On subjects ranging from vaccination, to abortion restric-
tions, to the teaching of intelligent design, to claims that children do
not fare well in homes with same-sex parents, judges—and judges
appointed by Presidents of both parties—are not only capable of fact-
checking when needed, but they also are rising to the occasion.
Touring a few examples of these “judicial success stories” provides
some lessons about what can be done to combat alternative facts in
the future.
First, consider what has happened in court to claims that vaccina-
tions cause autism. The factual claim is that the common MMR (mea-
sles mumps rubella) vaccination and/or the vaccinations’ preservatives
are linked to an increase in autism rates in children.346 This factual
assertion got a lot of traction following a well-publicized 1998 study by
Dr. Andrew Wakefield and his colleagues published in The Lancet
medical journal.347
Following dissemination of the Wakefield study, vaccination rates
in Britain dropped sharply—from ninety-two percent to seventy-three
percent and as low as fifty percent in parts of London.348 The scare
took hold in the United States as well. Dr. Paul Offit, director of the
Vaccine Education Center at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia,
concluded there was “no doubt” a connection between a measles out-
break in the United States and the factual claims coming from
Wakefield’s study.349
As vaccination rates dropped, litigation rates over vaccination
soared.350 To deal with the large number of cases involving a common
factual issue, the Federal Office of Special Masters (OSM) proposed a
special procedure by which the OSM could most efficiently process
346 For a history of the litigation and description of the claim, see Gordon Shemin,
Mercury Rising: The Omnibus Autism Proceeding, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 459, 478–79 (2008).
347 Andrew J. Wakefield et al., Ileal-Lymphoid-Nodular Hyperplasia, Non-Specific
Colitis, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children, 351 LANCET 637 (1998). The
Lancet later retracted the piece, but the article’s theory has refused to die. See, e.g., Nick
Triggle, Wakefield and Autism: The Story That Will Not Go Away, BBC NEWS, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8481583.stm (last updated Jan. 28, 2010) (calling it “the story
that just rumbles on and on”).
348 Mike Stobbe, Will Autism Fraud Report Be a Vaccine Booster?, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 6,
2011), http://archive.boston.com/lifestyle/health/articles/2011/01/06/will_autism_fraud_
report_be_a_vaccine_booster/.
349 Jim Axelrod, Doctor Blames Discredited Autism Research for Measles Outbreak,
CBS NEWS (Feb. 10, 2015) (quoting Dr. Paul Offit), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/doctor-
blames-discredited-autism-vaccine-link-research-for-measles-outbreak/.
350 See Shemin, supra note 346, at 462 (estimating the number of claims to be about
4900).
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the autism claims.351 The name of this special procedure was the
“Omnibus autism proceeding.” The idea was a group effort: The pro-
ceeding was proposed after holding several informal meetings in 2002
with plaintiffs and counsel for the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. The special proceeding had two steps: First, a large-scale
inquiry into the general causation issue involved in these cases—i.e.,
whether the vaccinations in question can cause autism—and then,
second, separate proceedings that would apply the evidence obtained
in that general inquiry to the individual cases.352
A team of petitioners’ lawyers was selected to represent the inter-
ests of the autism petitioners during the course of the initial general
causation inquiry.353 This inquiry included “a lengthy period of dis-
covery concerning the general causation issue, followed by a designa-
tion of experts for each side, an evidentiary hearing, and finally a
ruling on the general causation issue by a special master.”354
The evidence produced during this lengthy litigation revealed
that the science linking autism to vaccination was seriously flawed. For
one, Dr. Wakefield’s study was marred by a significant conflict of
interest. It turns out the study was funded by lawyers who wanted
evidence of a link between vaccines and autism in a suit against vac-
cine manufacturers, and the parents of some of the children in the
study were clients of the attorney as well.355 Upon learning of this
conflict, The Lancet retracted Wakefield’s study from their journal.356
Furthermore, in several large subsequent studies, the vast medical
consensus shows time and again that there is no link between vaccina-
tions and autism, even in children at high risk for the disease.357
351 For an in-depth procedural history of the Omnibus autism proceeding, see Cedillo v.
Secretary of Health & Human Services. No. 98-916V, 2009 WL 331968, at *7–8 (Fed. Cl.
Feb. 12, 2009).
352 Id. at *7.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 Brian Deer, Revealed: MMR Research Scandal, SUNDAY TIMES (Feb. 22, 2004), http:/
/briandeer.com/mmr/lancet-deer-1.htm.
356 Retracted Autism Study an “Elaborate Fraud,” British Journal Finds, CNN (Jan. 5,
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/01/05/autism.vaccines/.
357 See No MMR-Autism Link in Large Study of Vaccinated vs. Unvaccinated Kids,
AUTISM SPEAKS (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.autismspeaks.org/science/science-news/no-
mmr-autism-link-large-study-vaccinated-vs-unvaccinated-kids (“In the largest-ever study
of its kind, researchers again found that the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine did
not increase risk for autism spectrum disorder (ASD). This proved true even among
children already considered at high risk for the disorder.”); see also CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, SCIENCE SUMMARY: CDC STUDIES ON THIMEROSAL IN VACCINES, https://
www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/pdf/cdcstudiesonvaccinesandautism.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,
2018) (reporting that nine studies conducted by or with the involvement of the CDC
showed no link between vaccines and autism); INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
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Overwhelmingly, therefore, the vaccination courts got it right.358
They scrutinized the science and resisted an alternative fact that still
continues to plague the public discourse on the subject.359 Indeed
despite the debunking of the Wakefield study and persistent insistence
by the medical community that vaccines are safe, a recent poll
revealed that, while thirty-nine percent of Americans think the news
media exaggerates childhood vaccine health risks, twenty-four percent
still believe the media does not take the health risks seriously
enough.360
If politicians and their constituents are still divided on this issue,
why has the judicial reaction been virtually uniform in rejecting the
disputed science? What is unique and interesting about this example
of successful judicial fact-checking is that a national factual contro-
versy was litigated in a coordinated way using a special master and a
special court—but in a way that ensures buy-in from both sides. Cer-
tainly there are aspects about the vaccination controversy that make
this coordination effort easier (not the least of which is the existence
of the federal national vaccine compensation program), but perhaps
its success at resisting alternative facts should provide a hopeful
example that such judicial efforts—particularly when creatively mar-
shalled—can be successful.
Even without the nationwide coordination effort, lone district
judges are also resisting alternative facts. I have already mentioned
several district court abortion cases and their judges’ efforts to debunk
IMMUNIZATION SAFETY REVIEW: VACCINES AND AUTISM 1 (2004) http://
nationalacademies.org/HMD/Reports/2004/Immunization-Safety-Review-Vaccines-and-
Autism.aspx (“[T]he body of epidemiological evidence favors rejection of a causal
relationship between thimerosal-containing vaccines and autism.”).
358 See, e.g., Dwyer ex rel. Dwyer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 03-1202V,
2010 WL 892250, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 12, 2010) (rejecting petitioners claim that vaccination
caused a developmental disorder in their son); King ex rel. King v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., No. 03-584V, 2010 WL 892296, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 12, 2010) (similar);
Mead ex rel. Mead v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 03-215V, 2010 WL 892248, at
*1 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 12, 2010) (similar); Cedillo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 89 Fed.
Cl. 158, 164 (2009) (similar); Hazlehurst v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No.
03-654V, 2009 WL 332306, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 12, 2009) (similar). For an explanation of
the debunking of the science, see LEVITAN, supra note 193, at 195–96.
359 See Childhood Vaccines and Autism (C-SPAN television broadcast Dec. 10, 2002),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?174176-1/childhood-vaccines-autism (“I have yet to find any
scientist who will say that there is no doubt that the mercury in vaccines does not
contribute to autism. Now they’ll say there’s no scientific evidence there’s no to studies or
anything that proves that yet. But turn that around. There are no studies that disprove it
either.” (comments of Rep. Dan Burton) (transcript compiled from uncorrected Closed
Captioning)).
360 CARY FUNK ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., VAST MAJORITY OF AMERICANS SAY
BENEFITS OF CHILDHOOD VACCINES OUTWEIGH RISKS 67 (2017), http://www.pewinternet.
org/2017/02/02/public-views-of-media-coverage-on-childhood-vaccines/.
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experts in need of debunking,361 but yet another judicial success story
here comes in the case of Planned Parenthood v. Strange.362
The district court judge in Strange, Judge H. Myron Thompson,
could teach a master class on the benefits of trial and cross examina-
tion on alternative facts. In a methodical forty-two page opinion,
Judge Thompson literally goes through witness by witness in this case
about an Alabama statute which required all abortion providers to
have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals.363
Appropriately, Judge Thompson calls himself “a trial court in the
trenches,”364 and he not only goes through the testimony of all the
witnesses, but then makes the determination city by city in Alabama
whether any abortion provider would be left to provide services after
the statute goes into effect.365 In the process, the judge was able to
sniff out the undeclared influential fingerprints of the discredited
Vincent Rue on the state’s expert,366 to discover the decimal point
“error” made by Dr. Thorpe in purporting to establish abortion com-
plication rates,367 to identify methodological flaws in a poll purporting
to establish that other surgical procedures require admitting privileges
at nearby hospitals,368 and to impeach a state medical witness who
admitted on cross-examination to knowing very little about the med-
ical procedure of abortion.369 Judge Thompson was also able to recog-
nize witnesses whose testimony deserved crediting: those whose
research appeared in peer-reviewed journals, was based on years of
data collection, and was based on qualitative and quantitative
methods.370
361 See supra Section II.A.
362 Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2014).
363 Id. at 1332.
364 Id.
365 Id. at 1348–51.
366 Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1381, 1386–88 (M.D. Al.
2014) (debunking Dr. James Anderson).
367 Id. at 1394 (noting that Dr. Thorpe had “a disturbing apathy toward the accuracy of
his testimony”).
368 Id. at 1388–89 (discussing testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Hayes).
369 Id. at 1390 (discussing testimony of Dr. Christopher Duggar, who admitted: “To be
honest with you, I don’t know how they do first-trimester abortions. From what you hear,
you know, there’s a combination of both surgical and medical management, but that’s my
limit of knowledge.”).
370 Judge Thompson found that:
Freedman testified that quantitative research had shown that doctors who are
trained in abortion often do not perform abortions and that her own
qualitative research sought to explain why that was so. Her research was
developed over the course of extended interviews, which she analyzed using
text-analysis software in order to identify patterns and themes. . . . This
methodology was sufficient, both in its data and its approach, to assist the
court in its fact-finding.
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Being a trial court “in the trenches” is hard work. The Strange
litigation lasted over three years, culminating in a trial that took ten
days and required the judge to pay concentrated attention to almost a
dozen witnesses—not to mention the detail he paid to deposition
testimony.
But, as this example demonstrates, putting faith in the adversarial
system pays off. With hard work, Judge Thompson was able to sepa-
rate the credible from the not credible. And his work in this regard
was focused not just on who he believed in an abstract nebulous way,
but rather by hunting down process errors in the state’s factual claims:
misplaced decimal points, ghost-writing witnesses, admissions of igno-
rance on cross, etc. These are things that the adversarial system was
meant to catch when testing facts.
Indeed, the payoff can run beyond the case at hand. As discussed
above, news of the debunking of some of these witnesses (Rue and
Thorpe) spread to other courts in other states facing similar factual
claims.371 The “trenches” in other words can be shared by judges (with
access to Westlaw and Google) who are tasked with evaluating
common factual claims behind constitutional challenges.
Another example of the power of fact-checking can be found
with the studies purporting to establish that children do not thrive in
homes with two same-sex parents. Several district courts—notably
one in Michigan and one in California—have shown a willingness to
compare competing authorities on this question and to evaluate each
one at a micro-level.372 The district court in the Michigan case,
DeBoer v. Snyder, provides a helpful example. After reviewing the
evidence presented at trial, Judge Bernard Friedman (appointed by
Ronald Reagan) went through each expert’s testimony one at a time
in his opinion.373 He compared notes on the statistical methodology of
each study and was able to weigh the credibility of each.374
Id. at 1392–93.
371 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 973
n.24 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (acknowledging that Rue “ghost wrote or substantively edited
portions” of at least two expert witnesses’ reports which subsequently one expert could not
explain his report himself during trial); Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d
673, 680 n.3 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (“The court finds that, although the experts each testified
that they personally held the opinions presented to the court, the level of input exerted by
Rue undermines the appearance of objectivity and reliability of the experts’ opinions.”).
372 See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761–68 (E.D. Mich. 2014)
(discussing the parties’ witnesses and determining whether the testimony for each was
credible); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 980–81 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (stating
the testimony and exhibits relied upon by the court).
373 DeBoer, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 761–68.
374 Id.
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Cross-examination in DeBoer revealed that a study relied on to
establish that children do not thrive with same-sex couples (led by
sociologist Mark Regnerus) suffered from a significant conflict of
interest375—it was funded by the Witherspoon Institute, an organiza-
tion founded to oppose same-sex marriage.376 Judge Friedman ulti-
mately concluded that:
Regnerus’s testimony [was] entirely unbelievable and not worthy of
serious consideration. The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated
that his 2012 “study” was hastily concocted at the behest of a third-
party funder, which found it “essential that the necessary data be
gathered to settle the question in the forum of public debate about
what kinds of family arrangement are best for society” and which
was “confident that the traditional understanding of marriage will
be vindicated by this study.”377
Finally, lest one think district court fact-checking always leads to
left-leaning results, remember that the impressive and laudable fact-
checking in the 1999 hair-braider case, Cornwell v. Hamilton, resulted
in a win for economic liberty and the conservative Institute for
Justice.378 Further, at least one gun control enthusiast has been dis-
credited as overreaching on historical claims by courts in litigation
involving Second Amendment rights.379 Moreover there are also sev-
eral voter ID cases where district courts have done diligent work
expressing skepticism for blanket claims that such laws harm minority
voters.380
375 Id. at 766.
376 Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Mark Regnerus at 16–17,
DeBoer, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (No. 12-cv-10285), 2014 WL 1681586.
377 DeBoer, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 766 (quoting Plaintiff’s Motion, supra note 376).
378 See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text (discussing Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80
F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999)).
379 Michael A. Bellesiles’s initially highly acclaimed book, ARMING AMERICA: THE
ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL GUN CULTURE (2000), which purported to paint a historical
account of a gun-free America was subsequently undermined as historically inaccurate and
borderline fraudulent. See James Lindgren, Fall from Grace: Arming America and the
Bellesiles Scandal, 111 YALE L.J. 2195 (2002). This caused the Ninth Circuit to actually
amend an earlier opinion and remove a citation to Bellesiles’s work. Compare Silveira v.
Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1057 n.1, 1078 n.37 (9th Cir. 2002), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/gunlawsuits/silvlckyr120502opn.pdf (citing Bellesiles), with Silveira v. Lockyer, 312
F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2003) (as amended) (removing Bellesiles citations).
380 See, e.g., Jacksonville Coal. for Voter Prot. v. Hood, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1337 (M.D.
Fla. 2004) (challenging the view that these laws harm minority voters). One controversial
example is the recent North Carolina voter ID case. See N.C. State Conference of the
NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 344–48 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (discussing the
enactment of the voter ID law). The challenge alleged that the law—particularly the
sections that require ID and decrease early voting time—disproportionately depressed
voting by African Americans. Id. at 348. Following a bench trial, the district court judge,
Judge Thomas D. Schroeder, issued a one hundred-page opinion with extensive factual
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At the end of the day the point of all this is to underscore what
Kahan found—that judges are capable of combatting the risk of alter-
native facts and cognitive bias—and to stress the need to actualize
that potential. We need to build the deference doctrines around that
judicial capacity for objectiveness: by instructing courts to fact check
as part of their constitutional doctrine, and then by awarding defer-
ence based on the level of procedure used (both when debating defer-
ring to a legislature and deciding whether an appellate court should
defer to a trial court).
CONCLUSION
There is a new epidemic in our culture of looking to friends for
facts, only accepting news sanctioned by sympathetic sources, and dis-
tancing oneself from anyone who holds a contrary view. Judges live in
this same culture, and they are surrounded by evidence put forth by
lawyers who also breathe it in daily. The scary bottom line is that the
“my team-your team” mentality that comes from alternative facts is a
contagious disease and the law is not immune to it. The time has come
findings. He engaged in much of the nitty gritty fact-checking work that I argue is now
necessary in our federal courts. He uncovered that one of plaintiff’s witnesses used
outdated data to reach a conclusion about modern conditions, id. at 365, spotted that
plaintiff’s witnesses interviewed out-of-state residents on their knowledge of voter ID
exceptions but used that information to draw conclusions about minority North Carolina
voters, id. at 373, and he further observed that there is considerable uncertainty by experts
on whether early voting actually improves turnout by minority voters. Id. at 513. The
district court ultimately upheld the law, concluding that there was insufficient evidence of
intentional race discrimination in it. Id. at 529–30.
The Fourth Circuit reversed. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831
F.3d 204, 215 (4th Cir. 2016). The appellate court “commend[ed]” the trial court for its
“thoroughness,” but ultimately held that the district court clearly erred in its
“consideration of each piece of evidence in a vacuum, rather than engaging in the totality
of the circumstances analysis . . . . Any individual piece of evidence can seem innocuous
when viewed alone, but gains an entirely different meaning when considered in context.”
Id. at 214, 233. The Fourth Circuit emphasized the procedural quirkiness in how this law
was enacted (amended quickly by the legislature after Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612 (2013)) as well as the history of racial discrimination that has plagued North Carolina
politics for a long time. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 223, 227. Under Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), therefore, the Court
found intentional race discrimination. Id. at 233.
Evaluating the fact-checking in this case is complicated. It seems the district court
correctly spotted significant weaknesses in the plaintiff’s case—and thus, on my argument,
deserves deference for doing so—but it also seems that the Fourth Circuit correctly took a
bigger-picture view. This case may be an example of both levels of court doing what they
do best. The lower courts can spot the alternative facts, but the appellate courts are there
as a backstop in case the focus on the faulty facts leads to a problem in application of the
law.
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to arm our courts with doctrines that allow them to guard against
alternative facts in constitutional cases before law joins the ranks of a
“post-truth” discipline.
